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Abstract
Unethical pro-organizational behaviors (UPB) are unethical behaviors that are
intended to benefit the organization or its members. Research on this type of behavior
typically involves assessing attitudinal and dispositional predictors of UPB but has
largely failed to understand the process through which UPB occurs. One potential
elicitation process could be through a perceived obligation that an employee has to help
their organization, or citizenship pressure. By adapting Rest’s four stage model of ethical
decision-making and social exchange theory, the current study aimed to identify how
organizational identification might increase perceptions of citizenship pressure, and how
citizenship pressure might influence elements of the UPB decision-making process.
Using a sample of employed U.S. adults recruited via MTurk, we employed a scenariobased design. Results of multilevel analyses, controlling for social desirability, revealed a
significant relationship between citizenship pressure and some elements of UPB. Moral
disengagement did not significantly mediate the citizenship pressure-UPB relationship as
we hypothesized, but it had strong simple relationships with UPB. Finally, moral
intensity, or the severity of the immoral behavior, moderated the relationship between
moral disengagement and UPB. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating
that UPB may be caused, in part, by citizenship pressure. Further, we empirically
demonstrate that individuals have more difficulty disengaging from violations that they
judge as being more intense. Finally, ours is one of a few studies to examine moral
disengagement from a situational standpoint, and we found significant within-person
effects of moral disengagement across situations.

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

3

A Multilevel Examination of Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior Decisionmaking: The Role of Citizenship Pressure, Moral Disengagement, and Moral
Intensity
Unethical behavior in organizations remains as a very serious problem. Cases
such as the bribery and corruption conviction placed against Samsung’s Vice Chairman
(Neuman, 2018) or Apple’s intentional slowdown of old iPhones (Mullis, 2017) are all
too commonly seen on the front pages of newspapers and can often yield worldwide
implications and fallout. Recently, researchers have begun to focus their attention on a
particularly nuanced form of unethical behavior: unethical pro-organizational behavior
(UPB; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010). UPB resembles other unethical behaviors
in that the behavior would generally be regarded as unacceptable by the public (Treviño,
Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014), but is unique in that UPB is typically carried out
in attempt to benefit, not harm, the organization. In this way, UPB also possesses
elements that resemble helping behavior, where the goal of the behavior is a prosocial
outcome (Beardman, 2012). The unethicality of UPB raises the question of how and why
employees decide to engage in such behaviors. There is a critical need to better
understand the decision-making process surrounding UPB, and how it is similar and
different from the decision-making processes surrounding other organizational behaviors,
both ethical and unethical. If organizations understand the decision-making processes that
produce UPB, they can more effectively channel altruistic desires into more functional
behaviors such as OCB, preventing the damaging results of employee unethical
behaviors.
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Most of the research on UPB so far positions UPB as a response to positive
organizational feelings (Cullinan, Bline, Farrar, & Lowe, 2015; Matherne & Litchfield,
2012), with organizational identification standing out as the most prominently studied
and accepted (Chen, Chen, & Sheldon, 2016; Effelsberg, Solga, & Gurt, 2014; Johnson &
Umphress, 2018; Kong, 2015; Lee, Choo, & Jeon, 2016; Lee, Schwarz, Newman, &
Legood, 2017; May, Chang, & Shao, 2015; Teo & Chan-Serafin, 2013; Umphress et al.,
2010; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015), However, recent research in the helping behavior
literature has revealed that not all organizational helping is altruistic, and that employees
often perceive an expectation regarding extrarole helping behavior in the workplace
(Bolino, Turnley, Gilstrap, & Suazo, 2010; Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004). Considering the
substantial overlap between UPB and forms of organizational helping such as citizenship
behavior (Organ, 1988), a goal of this study is to examine if perceptions of extrarole
pressure have incremental validity beyond the widely accepted identification-UPB
relationship. Drawing upon social exchange theory and social identity theory, we
anticipated that individuals that highly identify with their organization would perceive
stronger obligations to engage in extrarole behaviors in order maintain in-group
membership within the organization, and that such perceived obligations would
encourage them to engage in UPB.
In addition, this study aimed to further unpack the decision-making process of
UPB in two major ways. First, this study was the first to examine UPB through the lens
of the four-stage model of ethical decision-making put forth by Rest, which has been
widely used in other unethical behavior research. Second, this study examined the
activation of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990; 1999), or rationalization mechanisms
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that help to avoid feelings of dissonance or guilt. Despite moral disengagement appearing
particularly salient for UPB given UPB’s prosocial nature, only a few studies have given
attention to moral disengagement’s role in UPB elicitation. Moral disengagement was
therefore examined in the current study as a potential mechanizing factor within the
citizenship pressure-UPB relationship, where elevated perceptions of pressure may
encourage individuals to morally disengage, thus allowing for UPB by avoiding feelings
of guilt or discomfort that typically result from immoral behavior.
Lastly, this study examined the impact of the severity of the unethical behavior, or
the moral intensity (Jones, 1991), on the decision-making process. While moral intensity
has been shown to predict unethical behavior of other forms, no research to date has
incorporated moral intensity into the study of UPB despite calls to do so (Umphress &
Bingham, 2011). We observe moral intensity to be influential in the elicitation of UPB,
such that individuals are less able to morally disengage from a behavior as the perceived
intensity of the behavior grows.
Taken together, these contributions broaden the literature’s approach to UPB by
integrating theories of helping behavior and moral cognition into the existing social
exchange and social identity framework. Using multiple vignettes and both a within- and
between-person design, this study examined UPB from a more nuanced, process-oriented
perspective that refines our understanding regarding UPB elicitation. The following
sections aim to introduce the proposed causal path studied, as well as review the literature
and on the factors relevant to the study. We will then present the specifics of the current
study methodology and how we tested our hypotheses, followed by discussion of our
anticipated outcomes of the study.
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Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior
Umphress and Bingham (2011) define UPB as “behavior that is intended to
promote the effective functioning of an organization or its members and violates core
societal values, mores, laws, and standards of conduct.” Examples of UPB can often been
seen in the real world, with instances such as the Volkswagen emissions scandal or the
fraudulent Wells Fargo practices likely involving UPB to some degree. Other examples
could include cooking the books in accounting jobs, lying to a customer regarding the
positives and negatives of a product, or selling a damaged product to an unsuspecting
customer. While other forms of unethical behavior are commonly motivated by negative
feelings toward the organization (Bauer & Spector, 2015; Harold, Oh, Holtz, Han,
Giacalone, 2016), or a desire to benefit one’s self (Pascual-Ezama, Prelec, & Dunfield,
2013), UPB is primarily motivated by a desire to benefit the organization, toward which
the employee holds positive regard. Given this clear distinction between UPB and many
other forms of unethical behavior, the nomological network for UPB has proven to be
very different from other forms of unethical behavior (Liu & Qiu, 2015).
Because UPB is prosocial in nature as an intention to help, research has found that
UPB typically results from positive employee attitudes and perceptions, where the
employee feels attached and connected to the organization or views it positively in some
regard. For instance, Matherne and Litchfield (2012) observed that affective commitment
positively predicted UPB, particularly when moral identity was low. Effelsberg, Solga,
and Gurt (2014) found perceptions of transformational leadership predicted UPB, such
that stronger perceptions led to more UPB engagement. Graham, Ziegert, and Capitano

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

7

(2015) found inspirational and charismatic leadership to be associated with follower
UPB.
While the literature on UPB is still developing, a very frequent finding has been
the positive relationship between organizational identification and UPB. This relationship
is thought to reflect the development of an attachment and sense of “we-ness” with the
organization, which ultimately drives employees to defend, aid, or support the
organization. That said, this relationship often necessitates a moderating individual
difference variable such as Machiavellianism (Effelsberg, et al., 2014), positive
reciprocity beliefs (Umphress et al., 2010), psychological entitlement (Lee et al., 2017),
or ethical considerations (Teo, Chan-Serafin, 2013). The combination of organizational
identification and an individual difference variable adheres to the person-situation
interactionist model as put forth by Treviño (1986), which is thought to be suitable for the
study of UPB (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The person-situation interactionist model
suggests that unethical behavior results from the interaction of situational characteristics,
often represented by employee attitudes as reflections of the situation, and individual
differences. According to this framework, UPB engagement is dependent not only on
how situations influence employee attitudes and perceptions, but also on personal
characteristics to either hinder or promote UPB involvement. While this approach is
helpful to suggest who might be more likely to engage in UPB and why they might be
motivated to do so, it does not allow for identifying specific process-related variables that
steer the actual UPB decision-making process. Hence, the decision-making process is still
somewhat of a “black box.” In fact, theories of ethical decision-making have been largely
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absent from the UPB literature, indicating our continued lack of understanding regarding
how employees ultimately make the decision to engage in these behaviors.
Overview of the Hypothesized Model
Similar to OCB, theories regarding why employees make the decision to engage
in UPB often draw from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), social identity theory
(Tajfel, 1982) and the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), which collectively state that,
within social exchange relationships, resources are passed back and forth between two
parties. As relationships grow stronger, the resources that are exchanged escalate and
become more social in nature, and feelings of identity and attachment develop
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). If one party fails to escalate or reciprocate exchanges,
the relationship can stagnate. Thus, to grow closer to one’s exchange partner and receive
future benefits, resources must continually be offered.
Because social exchange resources are beneficial for both parties, there often
exists a moral expectation of reciprocation within exchanges (Cropanzano & Mitchell,
2005), accompanied by a felt obligation to reciprocate (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel,
Lynch, & Rhodes, 2001). So far, research on UPB has seen strong resemblance to these
processes, with many studies finding organizational identification to predict UPB when
moderated by individual differences such as positive reciprocity beliefs,
Machiavellianism, moral identity, and psychological entitlement (Effelsberg, Solga, &
Gurt, 2014 2015; Johnson & Umphress, 2018; Lee et al., 2017; Teo & Chan-Serafin,
2013; Umphress et al., 2010). Other studies have adapted this framework to find
additional positive relationships between UPB and organizational attitudes, such as
affective commitment (Matherne & Litchfield, 2012) and work passion (Kong, 2015).
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These and other research studies indicate that an employee may feel compelled to engage
in UPB to reciprocate the positive treatment that the organization has bestowed on him or
her (Liu & Qiu, 2015; Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Wang, Long, Zhang, & He, 2018).
Thus, in many ways, the processes underlying UPB seem quite similar to those
underlying OCB. These parallels likely stem from the notion that both OCB and UPB are
intended to help the organization or its members; they are both at least partially altruistic
in nature. The major distinction between these two constructs is that while OCB is seen
as a positive form of organizational behavior, UPB violates ethical norms and thus can
also be highly damaging to the organization or to the person performing it.
Based on a synthesis of theory and research from the literatures on UPB, ethical
decision-making, and OCB, we propose that there may be four major elements involved
in the decision to engage in UPB. First, the employee feels a need to reciprocate positive
treatment displayed by the organization, and this perceived need has been shown to be in
response to highly identifying with the organization. While previous research has
established this perceived need as being a necessary part of social exchange, we draw
upon OCB literature that examines this need as a felt pressure rather than an altruistic
desire. There has been some suggestion that UPB can be motivated by perceptions other
than altruism, such as job insecurity (Lawrence & Kacmar, 2016) or social exclusion
(Thau, Derfler-Rozin, Pitesa, Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2014). Given the theoretical overlap
between OCB and UPB, to be discussed later, there is reason to believe that the recent
findings regarding the felt pressure of OCB will motivate UPB in a similar way.
Second, the employee must recognize the UPB as a potential means of
reciprocation. Although this element receives less attention in the present study, it fits
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with models of altruistic behavior which posit that in order to help, the individual must be
able to identify opportunities that would allow them to offer help (Betancourt, 1990;
Weiner, 1980).
Third, we suggest the integration of our model with that of Rest’s four stage
model of ethical decision-making (Rest, 1986). Rest’s model is one of the most widely
used frameworks for studying ethical decision-making (Craft, 2013), and has been
adapted to understand a wide variety of unethical behavior types, such as lying about
one’s performance (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011) and cheating (Cojuharenco,
Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Schminke, 2011). The four stages of the model are 1.)
recognizing that a moral issue is at hand, 2.) morally evaluating the issue, 3.) establishing
behavioral intent, and 4.) acting on the intention. These stages combine to form what is
considered a “deliberative” approach, where the ethical decision is primarily driven by
logical deduction (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005, Rest, 1986; Treviño et al., 2014).
Despite its frequent adoption in ethical decision-making research, no literature to
date has examined UPB in the context of Rest’s model. While most UPB literature
references the previously mentioned person-situation interactionist model (Treviño,
1986), this model does little to offer any in-depth explanation of cognitive processes that
motivate the behavior. In order to complement Treviño’s model, we suggest Rest’s four
stages as a series of cognitive steps that employees may engage in to ultimately reach the
decision to engage in UPB. That is, once the UPB is identified as a potential means of
reciprocation, the individual may then recognize the moral salience of the behavior,
morally evaluate the nature of the behavior, and form behavioral intentions before
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engaging in the behavior. If no moral issue is recognized, no moral evaluation is
necessary to take place, and behavioral intentions can be formed.
Lastly, in order for an employee to evaluate these immoral behaviors as being
acceptable, the employee must cognitively minimize the moral implications of
performing an unethical behavior using a cognitive exercise. To help explain this step, we
draw upon research from additional unethical decision-making literature in a future
section. The overall suggested process is modeled heuristically in Figure 1.
As with other social exchange research (Eisenberger et al., 2001 an individual
may be more likely to engage in UPB when they feel obligation to reciprocate or advance
the relationship. However, doing so requires that employees must either a) acknowledge
that the behavior is immoral and accept it, or b) cognitively minimize the moral
implications of the behavior. Related to the latter, Umphress and Bingham (2011) posit
that employees may neutralize the moral implications of a behavior by self-affirming that
the behavior is necessary, desired by the organization, or worth the violation via rational
reasoning (e.g., “this is what the organization would want me to do”). The employee’s
self-concept is therefore protected, and the behavior can be carried out without suffering
self-condemnation. Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999), and other similar constructs
such as neutralization (Sykes and Matza, 1957) and self-serving cognitive distortions
(Barriga & Gibbs, 1996), have been shown to contribute to unethical behavior in other
research (Frost, Ko, & James, 2007; Moore et al., 2012). Thus, we draw upon these
cognitive processes that have been shown to produce other forms of unethical behavior to
examine whether they may also play a role in the decision-making processes surrounding
UPB.

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

12

Figure 1
Heuristic Model of Proposed Steps in UPB Decision Making1

In terms of citizenship pressure, research has examined the role of citizenship
pressure regarding OCB and will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
We believe that the notion of pressure can extend to UPB decision-making processes as
well. While some UPBs may be performed out of true compassion or identification
toward the organization, some research suggests that external or environmental pressures
can generate feelings of anxiety regarding the organizational exchange relationship or
relationships with others inside the organization. Thau and colleagues (2015) found that
the risk of social exclusion was positively associated with UPB when employees had a

1

Note: The bracketed item in the model was not tested in the present study. UPB is inferred to take place
given previous decision-making process models for helping behavior that specify the necessity of
recognizing one’s ability to help when another is in need (Spector & Fox, 2002). The grey box in the figure
indicates the stages borrowed from Rest’s four-stage model of ethical decision-making (Rest, 1986).
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high need for inclusion. Lawrence and Kacmar (2016) found that job insecurity predicted
UPB, mediated by emotional exhaustion. Tian and Peterson (2016) found that ethical
pressure, or pressure to compromise their ethical values, led accountants to be more
lenient in evaluating fraudulent accounting practices. Common across these studies is the
notion that access to positive social resources, such as job security or in-group status,
may be seen as threatened by the employee if external or environmental contexts suggest
the employee is insufficiently contributing to the organization, group, or relationship. The
employee may therefore turn to UPB as a way to increase social exchange contribution,
thereby securing those resources and encouraging future exchanges.
Given this and other research, it appears likely that when an individual is under
pressure to maintain or advance organizational relationships and is presented an
opportunity to engage in UPB that would satisfy that demand, the individual’s moral
evaluation of the behavior may become skewed toward being more tolerant. By
internally forming rational arguments aimed at justifying the moral violation as necessary
or important, individuals can reduce the sanctions placed upon themselves that are
typically experienced leading up to or following unethical behavior engagement. Because
the moral implication of the behavior is therefore lessened, UPB becomes a more
attractive option as an exchange resource for the individual to offer to satisfy perceived
social exchange demands. These processes will be discussed further below in the section
on moral disengagement, which reflects cognitive processes related to the engagement in
unethical behaviors.
In the following section, I will review the literature on citizenship pressure (felt
pressure to perform OCBs). OCB is like UPB in that both behaviors are not formally
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required in job descriptions, are often motivated by an intent to help, and are both offered
by employees within the context of strong organizational exchange relationships
characterized by strong identification (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2005; Rioux & Penner,
2001; Umphress et al., 2010). No research has yet empirically examined the role of felt
pressure to reciprocate positive treatment (i.e., citizenship pressure) in UPB. Considering
the theoretical nearness of OCB to UPB, it is worth investigating if the elicitation process
of OCB due to felt obligations is like that of UPB, in that both behaviors are aimed at
satisfying exchange-related demands. Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to
review how and why OCB is produced by such perceptions. Thus, I will next review the
literature on pressure to perform OCB.
Citizenship Pressure
Organizational citizenship behavior, or discretionary, extrarole behavior that
promotes the effective functioning of the organization (Organ, Podsakoff, & Mackenzie,
2005), has become a staple criterion in the study of exchange relationships in the
workplace. OCB has repeatedly been shown to be related to concepts such as LMX,
organizational justice, transformational leadership, perceived organizational support, and
many more (Lynch, Eisenberger, & Armeli, 1999; for reviews, see Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000 and Spitzmuller, Van Dyne, & Ilies, 2008).
Examples of OCB include going out of your way to assist a coworker, protecting
organizational property, or having above average work attendance (Williams &
Anderson, 1991).
Within a social exchange framework, OCB can be used by employees to
reciprocate positive behavior. As an organization escalates the relationship from one that
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is purely transactional, such as monetary payment in exchange for time worked, to one
that is more social, with resources such as support or justice, the employee will not only
develop a sense of identity, or “we-ness,” with the organization (Rupp & Cropanzano,
2002), but also a sense of obligation to support the organization in some way. Because
the organization progressed the relationship beyond what the employee perceived as
being transactionally required, the employee can use OCB, in addition to other resources
such as increased effort (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001) or
rule-following (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) to reciprocate in kind.
Historically, OCB has been positioned as a desirable outcome that employers
should seek to maximize from their employees. Indeed, research suggests that employees
who feel more positively about their organizations are more likely to engage in OCB.
Predictors of OCB are many, including job satisfaction, affective commitment,
perceptions of fairness, leader support and perceived relationship strength, as well as
several dispositional traits such as conscientiousness and empathy (LePine, Erez, &
Johnson, 2002; Spitzmuller, Van Dyne, & Ilies, 2008). However, recent research has
suggested that individuals may perform OCB not only because they want to, but also
because they feel external obligation or pressure to do so.
Employees may feel that refraining from engaging in citizenship behaviors,
despite not being technically required by a job description, will negatively impact their
standing within the organization. Known as citizenship pressure, feelings of obligation
regarding participation in OCB are thought to stem from a number of motivations, such
as a desire to meet perceived expectations or standards (Vigoda-Gadot, 2006), an
assumption that citizenship is a formal requirement of the job (McAllister, Kamdar,
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Morrison, & Turban, 2007), or a desire to remain in good standing with one’s employer
(Bolino, Turnley, Gilstrap, & Suazo, 2010; Marinova, Moon, & Van Dyne, 2010). They
therefore choose to engage in OCB partially because they fear the negative repercussions
of not engaging in them.
Citizenship pressure can develop because of many different circumstances and
can stem from both explicit direction from management as well as implicit evaluations or
perceptions made by the employee. For instance, job creep occurs when one’s role
responsibilities gradually expand to include contributions that were previously considered
discretionary. While employees may carry out these behaviors to be evaluated positively
by management or peers, the implicit demand of new responsibilities can introduce strain
on the employee to perform them (Van Dyne & Ellis, 2004). Job creep can also lead to
escalating citizenship, in which regularly engaging in OCB gradually becomes a standard
component of the job. This forces the employee to go to even further lengths to appear as
a “good soldier,” iteratively resetting a baseline level of behavior further and further
away from their formal job description (Bolino & Turnley, 2003). Employees could also
feel pressure due to subjective OCB norms, in which they must engage in OCBs to keep
up with coworkers’ OCB involvement, and failing to do so could put them at a
comparative disadvantage (Erhart & Naumann, 2004). Perceived citizenship pressure
could also be a product of his or her personality or individual differences, such as
conscientiousness, workaholism (Ng, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2007), or personal OCB
norms, each of which generate a sense of obligation to go the extra mile for work even
when there is no clear direction or need to do so.
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Because OCBs performed under pressure are not entirely volitional, employees
may experience a sense of injustice or anger regarding the pressure (Bolino & Klotz,
2003), or feel fatigued by the constant requirement (Bolino, Hsiung, Harvey, LePine,
2015). Thus, despite its positive relationship with OCB, citizenship pressure has been
shown to also be associated with negative outcomes such as increased job stress and
work-family conflict, decreased job satisfaction, and increased intentions to quit (Bolino
et al., 2010). In its entirety, this body of research shows strong indication that while OCB
is generally a reflection of a strong employee-organization relationship, OCB may also be
a symptom of a harmful employee perception regarding behavioral expectations.
While positive organizational attitudes and perceptions increase willingness to
engage in OCB (Dukerich, Golden, & Shortell, 2002; Callea, Urbini, & Chirumbolo,
2016), we posit that these attitudes, namely organizational identification, can evoke
feelings of citizenship pressure that might mechanize the identification-OCB relationship
in certain situations. That is, as an individual’s identification grows, his or her desire to
contribute to the relationship will grow as well so as not to lose the resources that the
relationship provides. In a paper discussing the similar topic of OCB norms, Ehrhart and
Naumann (2004) suggest that as an individual becomes more attached or attracted to the
group of which they are part, the link between subjective OCB norms and behavior will
strengthen, as employees are more driven to fulfill the norms and further secure their
place in the organization. Another paper examining role perceptions and OCB found that
those with more favorable attitudes regarding their organization are more likely to view
OCB as in-role rather than extra-role, in which case the employee has less discretion to
engage or not engage in the behavior (Tepper, Lockhart, Hoobler, 2001). We therefore
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expect for organizational identification to have a similar effect on citizenship pressure.
That is, it is likely that employees who wish to secure or enhance their identity as
members of their organization will experience citizenship pressure. Conversely, when
organizational identification is low, there is less urgency to satisfy citizenship demands as
the employee’s self-esteem is less personally tied to their organizational membership, and
therefore less concerned with maintaining the relationship. It is therefore hypothesized
that:
Hypothesis 1: Organizational identification will be positively associated
with perceived pressure to engage in citizenship behaviors.
Citizenship Pressure and UPB
While the citizenship pressure literature until this point has solely focused on its
relationship with OCB, which are generally perceived as beneficial and socially
acceptable, it is possible that citizenship pressure could encourage employees to perform
UPB. There is substantial theoretical overlap between OCB and UPB suggesting this is
the case. First, because both OCB and UPB are extrarole behaviors, both can be offered
by employees as an additional way to advance the relationship beyond intrarole behaviors
(Masterson et al., 2000; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). As the social exchange
relationship grows, the confines of one’s job may limit the extent to which one can
escalate the relationship via intrarole behaviors alone. Behaviors such as OCB or UPB
allow the employee to go “above and beyond,” thereby increasing his or her social
exchange contributions.
Second, past empirical research demonstrates that engagement in both OCB and
UPB also tends to increase as organizational identification develops (Callea, Urbini, &
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Chirumbolo, 2016; Kong, 2015; Umphress et al., 2010, Van Dick, Grojean, Christ, &
Wieseke, 2006). Theoretically, an employee who strongly identifies with his or her
organization positions his or her membership in the organization as central to one’s selfconcept, and experiences successes and failures of the organization as if they were
happening to them. (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Because one’s state of well-being is
intertwined to that of the organization, organizational identification encourages one to
perform behaviors that are supportive and enhancing to fate of the organization with
which he or she identifies (Mael & Ashforth, 1995).
Lastly, there is evidence that willingness to engage in both OCB and UPB
increases as a response to threats to the integrity of social or organizational relationships
(Lawrence & Kacmar, 2016; Tian & Peterson, 2015, Van Dyne & Ellis, 2004).
Employees may therefore attempt to increase their contribution to the exchange
relationship as a way to ensure that exchanges continue. Thau et al. (2015) found that
when an employee perceived that he or she was at risk of being excluded from a group,
the employee was more willing to engage in UPB as a way to enhance their contribution
to the group and therefore his or her value. Similarly, Loi, Ngo, Zhang, and Lau (2011)
found that LMX was a stronger predictor of altruistic helping when job security was low.
The authors suggest that when job security is at risk, employees will be more attentive
and work harder to gain and retain work resources contributive to job security, such as
LMX. Helping behavior therefore serves as a way to enhance LMX and therefore shield
oneself from an insecure job situation (Loi et al., 2011; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). For
these and other reasons, we conclude that when employees perceive that their group

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

20

membership and access to organizational resources is in danger, both UPB and OCB can
be used as a way to boost contributions and secure their position.
Given the significant overlap between OCB and UPB, it is likely that employees
will perform UPB in a way similar to OCB in response to citizenship pressure (Bolino et
al., 2010). That is, when opportunities for discretionary unethical behaviors present
themselves, and these behaviors would help to satisfy the perceived pressure to contribute
to the social exchange relationship, employees may more readily engage in the behavior.
By neutralizing the moral violation, the unethical act is less discomforting, and the
behavior could be carried out without interference from one’s self-concept (Moore,
Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). It is therefore
predicted that:
Hypothesis 2: Perceived pressure to engage in citizenship behaviors will
be positively associated to UPB.
Despite these similarities, one obvious difference between OCB and UPB is the
moral violation that is present with UPB but not OCB. Rationalizations such as “The
organization would want me to do this,” or “The organization needs me to do this,” as
suggested by Kelman and Hamilton (1989), indicate that employees place the needs of
the organization above that of the wellbeing of the customer, environment, or society.
That is, the employee looks beyond what they instinctually believe to be “moral”
behavior to contribute to the exchange and therefore retain their identity as a member of
the group. Though there is no moral implication to avoid, a similar cognitive exercise
appears to take place when considering OCB. Drawing from social identity theory, the
desire to remain within the social exchange relationship and therefore retain their identity
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as a member of the organization is important for the employee’s self-concept. To
therefore contribute to the well-being of the organization is to partially contribute to their
own, and behaviors that do so, such as OCB or UPB, will likely be viewed more
favorably. Employees may therefore rationalize the sacrifice of personal resources, such
as personal comfort, stress, or work-family balance, in favor of OCB, as being necessary
or desired by the organization (Bolino et al., 2010) in similar ways as rationalizing UPB.
However, to better understand the role that these rationalizing cognitions play in the
ultimate decision, they must be directly studied. We aim to incorporate a particularly
prominent rationalization process, moral disengagement, which we believe helps to
clarify how citizenship pressure influences UPB.
Moral Disengagement
According to Bandura (1986), employees tend to self-govern their behavior to
remain within ethical boundaries in order to avoid the self-condemnation they expect
would occur following an unethical behavior. However, if the connection between the
unethical behavior and self-condemnation were to be distorted or ambiguated, the
behavior may appear less detestable. Bandura theorized that such a disruption to this
connection can occur via cognitive mechanisms that aim to excuse the immoral behavior
and avoid distress. Bandura proposed eight cognitive mechanisms, with examples
including morally justifying the behavior as serving the greater good, diffusing
responsibility across multiple members of a group, and others (see Table 1). Collectively,
these eight mechanisms make up moral disengagement.
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Table 1. Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 1986)
Mechanism
Description
Moral Justification
Reframe the unethical act as being in service of the greater
good.
Euphemistic labeling

Rename the harmful act to appear more benign.

Advantageous
comparison

Contrasts between a behavior under consideration and an
even more reprehensible behavior to make the former seem
innocuous.
Attribute responsibility of unethical act to authority figures
who may have tacitly condoned or explicitly directed the
behavior.
Disperse responsibility for one’s actions across members of
a group.

Displacement of
responsibility
Diffusion of
responsibility
Distortion of
consequences

Minimize the seriousness of the effects of the unethical act.

Dehumanization

Frame the victims of the unethical act as undeserving of
basic human consideration.

Attribution of blame

Assign responsibility to the victims themselves.

Related to unethical behavior, moral disengagement has shown to be predictive of
self- and other-reported unethical behavior beyond other similar individual differences
such as moral identity, cognitive moral development, Machiavellianism, and dispositional
guilt (Moore et al., 2012). Negative affect was found to predict unethical behavior more
strongly for those high in moral disengagement compared to those who were low
(Samnani, Salamon, & Singh, 2014). Moral disengagement also moderated the
relationship between having previously been insulted and retaliation, such that
individuals retaliated more strongly if they had a propensity to morally disengage (WhiteAljmani & Bursik, 2014). The relationship between high self-monitoring and unethical

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

23

behavior was also mediated by moral disengagement (Ogunfowora, Bourdage, &
Nguyen, 2014).
While moral disengagement is often examined as an individual difference,
Bandura also theorized moral disengagement to occur in the form of a process in which
the act of moral disengagement is activated via environmental cues. Bandura views moral
disengagement as a “dynamic disposition,” where certain situations are more likely to
activate moral disengagement than others, but individuals will vary systematically
regarding their propensity to respond to it (Bandura, 1999). He and other researchers
(Bonner, Greenbaum, & Mayer, 2014; Moore, 2015) view these two forms, the
characteristic and the process, as interactive. Because research has shown moral
disengagement to mechanize relationships between more distal predictors and behavior,
as well as influence the strength of relationships between predictors and behavior, moral
disengagement has been observed as both a mediating and moderating factor (see Moore,
2015 for a review).
For the process of moral disengagement to occur, situational factors must activate
one or more of the cognitive mechanisms. When individuals perceive the expected
outcome of an immoral behavior to be highly desirable, they will often experience a
dissonance between their personal adherence to ethicality and their desire for the
outcome. This dissonance triggers moral disengagement mechanisms to resolve the
internal conflict, as it neutralizes self-sanctions while also allowing for the valued benefit
to be enjoyed (Bandura, 1990; Moore et al., 2012). As an example, when the opportunity
arises for a car salesperson to lie to a customer regarding a car’s accident history, the
salesperson’s self-regulatory processes should encourage the salesperson to resist the
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behavior and tell the truth. However, because the outcome of the lie (selling the car) is
highly desirable, moral disengagement mechanisms that are appropriate for the situation,
such as distortion of consequences (“they’ll never be able to tell a difference anyway”) or
advantageous comparison (“this car’s history isn’t nearly as bad as that car we sold last
week”), will become activated to cancel the moral implication of the behavior. Thus, the
behavior will be allowed to pass through self-regulating barriers and the salesperson can
avoid self-sanctions that would be damaging to his or her self-esteem.
Previous research has found that citizenship pressure increases willingness to
engage in OCB (Bolino et al., 2010). Considering this link, it is reasonable to conclude
that satisfying citizenship pressure via OCB is a desirable outcome to the individual, as it
secures the individual’s position within the organization-individual social exchange
relationship. As moral disengagement is typically activated when the outcome of a
decision is desirable (Bandura, 1999; 2002), it is likely that experiencing citizenship
pressure will more readily activate moral disengagement compared to when no pressure
is present. That is, individuals may, knowingly or unknowingly, deploy moral
disengagement cognitive resources in order to more aptly justify certain behaviors with
the ultimate goal of satisfying citizenship pressure.
Hypothesis 3: Citizenship pressure will be positively related with moral
disengagement.
Prevention Regulatory Focus
While we expect citizenship pressure to increase the likelihood of moral
disengagement becoming activated, we recognize that there are other factors that could
influence this relationship as well that are worth testing. In considering what may come
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into play during the moral disengagement activation process, one’s regulatory focus
would certainly be impactful as it regulates the individual’s cognitions and behavior in
the pursuit of some goal (Higgins, 1997). Such self-regulation typically takes place in one
of two foci: promotion focus and prevention focus. Having a promotion focus involves
having a tendency to engage in riskier, more goal-forward behaviors in attempt to attain
advancement, while prevention focus adheres to an avoidance of harmful outcomes, even
if doing so means missing out on opportunities. Promotion focus has been shown to
predict behaviors that are generally reflective of personal achievement such as innovative
performance (Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), OCB, and task performance (Gorman, et
al., 2012; Neubert, Wu, & Roberts, 2013), while prevention focus has been shown to
relate to CWB and safety performance (Lanaj et al., 2012) and produce feelings of
dissatisfaction in one’s job (Gorman et al., 2012). Only one study has examined
regulatory focus in the context of UPB. Graham and colleagues (2015) examined
promotion regulatory focus amidst a three-way moderation with leadership style and
gain/loss framing, and found that charismatic leadership that used loss framing produced
greater levels of UPB when promotion regulatory focus was low, but not when promotion
regulatory focus was high.
While promotion focused individuals are typically strongly attached and
committed to their organization and tend to display high levels of motivation (Whitford
& Moss, 2009) and optimism (Gorman et al., 2012), prevention focused individuals tend
to be more neurotic, focus more heavily on negative emotions, and worry more
frequently (Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012; Van Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Our proposed
relationship between citizenship pressure and moral disengagement activation presumes
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that the anxious and uncomfortable feelings that an individual may feel as a result of the
citizenship pressure may push them to engage in moral disengagement. For someone with
a promotion focus, this perception may not be interpreted as a threat to the relationship,
but rather an opportunity to rise to the challenge and perform their best (Amabile,
Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005). For someone with prevention focus, however, the
threat of damaging an exchange relationship via unfulfilled citizenship demands, and thus
losing the resources that the relationship offers, could push the employee to exercise
moral disengagement more readily. The likelihood of this is reflected in the fact that
prevention focused individuals tend to hold higher perceptions of continuance
commitment (Neubert, Wu, & Roberts, 2013), and feel negatively regarding their levels
of engagement in OCB (Koopman, Lanaj, & Scott, 2015). Considering this, it is likely
that they may not be able to tolerate the uncertainty that could result from letting the
relationship weaken. Having a prevention focus could therefore facilitate the activation of
moral disengagement in order to more easily justify engaging in behaviors that could
relieve such uncertainty. It is therefore hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 4: Prevention regulatory focus will moderate the relationship between
citizenship pressure and moral disengagement, such that the relationship will be
stronger when prevention regulatory focus is high.
Regarding the relationship between moral disengagement and UPB, very few
studies have examined this relationship. Lee and Schwarz (2017) found that moral
disengagement mediated the relationship between psychological entitlement and UPB,
such that psychological entitlement can lead to UPB when moral disengagement becomes
activated. Valle, Kacmar, and Zivnuska (2016) found that moral disengagement mediated
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the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and UPB, where
organizational politics encouraged employees to morally disengage and therefore engage
in UPB without constraint. Zhu (2018) found that moral disengagement mediated the
relationship between authoritarian leadership and UPB, such that authoritarian leadership
produces higher levels of UPB due to moral disengagement. More relevantly, Ebrahimi
and Yurtkoru (2017) found moral disengagement to mediate the relationship between
affective commitment and UPB. Lastly, Chen, Chen, and Sheldon (2016) found that
moral disengagement mediated the relationship between organizational identification and
UPB. The authors of these studies explicate these findings to suggest that when
organizational identification is high, the prosocial outcome of UPB will be more highly
desirable. These four studies align to Bandura’s perspective, where moral disengagement
is activated prior to the behavior in order to justify the engagement in the UPB despite its
unethical implication. The individual can then engage in the desired behavior that helps
their organization, while also minimizing damage to self-esteem that would typically
follow engaging in such personally devalued behaviors (Chen et al., 2016, Ebrahimi &
Yurtkoru, 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Valle et al., 2016).
Chen and colleagues (2016) were the first to introduce moral disengagement as an
active influence on the elicitation of UPB in the context of social identity and social
exchange, but we aim to further unpack this process of elicitation. While Chen and
colleagues (2016) position moral disengagement as a direct result of organizational
identification, we suggest that the perception of citizenship pressure precedes the
activation of moral disengagement. That is, it is expected that there would be less reason
for moral disengagement mechanisms to be activated and deployed when no external
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clues suggesting insufficient contributions to the relationship are present. Conversely,
perceived pressure to contribute to the relationship will push employees to consider a
broader range of behavioral options, potentially including behaviors of unethical nature
(Mitchell, Baer, Ambrose, Folger, & Palmer, 2018). Evidence of this link has been shown
in the accounting literature, in that fraud is more likely to occur when employees perceive
a climate that encourages behaviors that instrumentally benefit the organization (Murphy
& Free, 2015). In order for the behavior to be carried out without damaging the
individual’s self-esteem or identity as a moral person, moral disengagement mechanisms
are deployed (Bandura, 1999). However, if moral disengagement is not activated and the
individual’s self-regulatory processes remain intact, the individual will be better equipped
to resist the temptation to engage in the behavior despite the relational implication of
doing so. We therefore predict a mediating relationship, with moral disengagement
mediating the relationship between citizenship pressure and UPB.
Hypothesis 5: Moral disengagement will mediate the association of
citizenship pressure with UPB.
When examining the evolution of UPB through organizational identification,
citizenship pressure and moral disengagement, it would be remiss to ignore that the
willingness with which an employee engages in a UPB as a result of citizenship pressure
is likely partially contingent on the nature of the specific UPB in question. Umphress and
Bingham (2011) even suggest that the severity of an unethical behavior is likely highly
influential, and that it is crucial to examine the impact that severity of the behavior has
rather than assuming a linear relationship. To examine this factor, we draw upon research
surrounding the moral intensity of unethical behaviors.
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Moral Intensity
Despite its potentially altruistic motives, UPB constitutes unethical behavior;
thus, factors from the unethical decision-making literature may also be relevant to the
UPB decision making process. During any ethical decision-making process, a wide
variety of factors come into play (see Craft, 2013 for a review). While individual
differences and organizational attitudes dominated the ethical decision-making literature
for several decades, it wasn’t until Jones’ (1991) introduction of moral intensity as part of
his Issue-Contingent Model that researchers began to account for situational factors that
may be influencing one’s decision. Moral intensity refers to six situational characteristics
that an employee may implicitly consider when faced with an opportunity to engage in
unethical behavior. Those characteristics are 1.) magnitude of consequences, social
consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of
effect (Jones, 1991, see Table 2 for more information). These characteristics are thought
to work together interactively, such that the more intense the behavior, the more vivid,
salient, and extreme it will be perceived.
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Table 2. Moral Intensity Components (Jones, 1991)
Component
Description
Magnitude of
The sum of the harms done to victims of the moral act in
Consequences
question
Social Consensus

The degree of social agreement that a proposed act is evil

Probability of Effect

Joint function of the probability that the act in question will
take place and the act in question will cause the harm
predicted
Length of time between the present and the onset of
consequences of the moral act in question

Temporal Immediacy

Proximity

Concentration of Effect

Feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or
physical) that the moral agent has for victims of the evil act
in question
Inverse function of the number of people affected by an act
of a given magnitude

Moral intensity has been shown to impact each stage of Rest’s Four-Stage model
of ethical decision-making, in that it influences one’s recognition, evaluation, intent, and
ultimate engagement in unethical behavior (Leitsch, 2006; May & Pauli, 2002; McMahon
& Harvey, 2007). Further, there is evidence that moral intensity acts as a buffer between
predictors of unethical behavior and the behaviors themselves (Craft, 2013; May and
Pauli, 2002; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Douglas, Davidson, and Schwartz (2001)
found that perceiving a morally intense situation weakened the relationship between
ethical orientation and judgment. Douglas et al. (2001) also found moral intensity
moderated the relationship between ethical culture, as represented by an emphasis on rule
following and a clear code of conduct, and ethical judgments. Bhal and Dadhich (2011)
found that moral intensity moderated the relationship between leader-member exchange
and whistleblowing. Several other studies have found support for perceptions of the
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situation influencing the relationship between a variety of predictors and unethical
recognition, judgment, intent, and behavior (Callanan, Rotenberry, Perri, & Oehlers,
2010; Greenberg, 2002). These and other research studies suggest that the more morally
intense a behavior is perceived to be, the more capable employees are to resist
motivations of the behavior and establish moral, rather than immoral, intent.
Given its observed tendency to buffer against predictors of unethical behavior
across individuals and situations (Bhal & Dadhich, 2011; Callanan et al., 2010; Douglas
et al., 2001; Greenberg, 2002), moral intensity will likely be integral in the elicitation of
UPB. However, the specific role that moral intensity may play in the current process,
particularly regarding the deployment and ultimate effectiveness of moral disengagement
mechanisms, is difficult to theoretically predict. It therefore may be beneficial to consider
two models, represented by two competing hypotheses, that differ in their proposed
theoretical rationale regarding moral intensity.
The first model positions moral intensity as an influencing factor on the
relationship between moral disengagement and UPB. That is, because more intense
behaviors are more easily resisted (May & Pauli, 2002), it is possible that moral intensity
will buffer against the influence of moral disengagement on UPB. A study by Moore
(2008) found that moral disengagement mechanisms can be deployed when moral
dissonance is expected, but not yet experienced. As a result, moral disengagement
mechanisms may already be activated by the time the moral intensity of the situation is
considered as part of one’s moral evaluation. As such, the moral intensity of a situation
may not prevent moral disengagement mechanisms from deploying, but the individual
will be less able to excuse the behavior via moral disengagement mechanisms as the
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moral intensity of the behavior grows. As the immorality of the act becomes undeniable,
moral disengagement mechanisms will be of little to no use. When the moral intensity of
a behavior is quite low, protecting the self-esteem via moral disengagement mechanisms
will therefore be much more effective as the illegitimacy of the mechanisms as actual
rationale arguments becomes less clear. Thus, engaging in the behavior will become more
likely. It is therefore hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 6a: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship between
moral disengagement and UPB, such that the relationship will be stronger
when moral intensity is low, and weaker when moral intensity is high.
As a counter-perspective, it may also be possible that moral intensity
could influence the actual deployment of the moral disengagement mechanisms
rather than the effectiveness of them. According to Rest’s four-stage model, an
individual must first recognize via circumstantial clues that a behavior has moral
salience in order to make a moral evaluation. Many studies have found that moral
intensity influences this moral recognition stage in addition to the other stages
(May & Pauli, 2002; McMahon & Harvey, 2007), indicating that moral intensity
is relevant to the decision-making process even prior to the evaluation stage. This
aligns with Bandura (1990) and Moore (2015), who suggest that moral
disengagement is triggered by contextual cues which help determine the moral
salience of a situation. As this contextual information is being considered to
determine the efficacy of morally disengaging, it is likely that this information
also includes the moral intensity of the behavior.

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS
While escalated perceptions of citizenship pressure may cause moral
disengagement mechanisms to be activated more frequently, it is likely that
increasing levels of moral intensity would cause moral disengagement to be
implicitly or explicitly deemed inappropriate. Thus, deployment of the
mechanisms may be hampered or avoided altogether. Conversely, if a behavior is
not morally intense, cognitive mechanisms may be deployed in attempt to go
forward with neutralizing the relatively low level of self-criticism which would
result. As such our second competing hypothesis regarding moral intensity is:
H6b: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship between citizenship
pressure and moral disengagement, such that the relationship will be
weaker when moral intensity is high and stronger when moral intensity is
low.

Figure 2
Hypothesized Model
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Method
Participants
Seven hundred and fourteen participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Some research suggests that MTurk samples may be more representative
than college student samples, such that MTurk will select from a wider range of
occupations, age, and education level, therefore typically leading to more generalizable
representation (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). Beyond this, the
current study aims to address workplace behavior, and a typical college student would
likely lack much workplace experience in one’s professional career path.
Participants first responded to a prescreen measure. Nine participants did not
consent to this prescreen and withdrew from the study. Participants were qualified to take
part in the full study if they were employed (89 people screened out), worked more than
19 hours per week (28 people screened out), and were employed by an organization other
than themselves (i.e., self-employed; 57 people screened out). A comprehension check
was also included, in which a snippet of a news story was presented, followed by 3
questions regarding basic facts of the story. 19 people failed this comprehension check.
Those that were screened out by the prescreen were dismissed and did not take part in the
full study. When the screened-in participants were asked if they were interested in
continuing to the full study, 33 people opted out of doing so. In total, 226 participants
were removed as part of the prescreening procedure. In the full study, six participants
failed to respond correctly to the attention check items (“For this question, please select
strongly agree.”) which were dispersed throughout the survey. After all screening
procedures, 473 participants remained.
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Because we created new, vignette version of the UPB scale, we designed our data
collection to help validate our measure. Thus, one-third (n = 161) of the sample was
randomly assigned a form of the survey that used the original UPB items as put forth by
Umphress et al. (2010). This subsample was held separate from the main study sample
and used in exploratory analyses concerning vignette validity, which will be discussed in
a later section.
After setting aside one-third of the sample, data for the 312 remaining participants
administered were screened using several psychometric procedures. First, we noted that
only 5 observations in the entire dataset were missing. To impute these values, the
participant’s mean for the rest of the scale items was used. Insufficient effort responding
(Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & Deshon, 2012) was examined using three
established methods: 1.) Long-string responding, which examines the number of
consecutive items for which a single response option was used, 2.) individual reliability,
which examines the reliability for items on the same scales by splitting each scale in half
and assessing correlations of the half sets, and 3.) psychometric antonyms, which
identifies individuals whose responses do not meet typical response patterns for items
that are strongly negatively correlated. Using cut-offs recommended by Johnson (2005),
19 participants were flagged by the long-string responding method, individual reliability,
and psychometric antonyms (6, 2, and 11, respectively). These participants were
removed. Multivariate outliers were also identified using Mahalanobis Distances,
calculated using the between-measures only (df = 6). Two participants were identified
and removed, leaving a final sample size of 291.
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For the sample used to test the hypotheses (N = 291), demographics were as
follows: 171 (59%) were female, and 118 (41%) were male. Racially, 208 (71%) were
Caucasian/White, 22 (8%) were African American/Black, 27 (9%) were Asian/Asian
American, 22 (8%) were Hispanic/Latin American, and all other races made up the
remaining 4%. Regarding religious beliefs, 86 (30%) reported as Christian - Protestant,
62 (21%) as Catholic, 55 (19%) as agnostic, 49 (17%) as atheist, and 17 (6%) as Other,
with all other religions making up the remaining 7%. The average age of the sample was
38.50 (SD = 20.21). The sample was relatively well-educated, with 178 (61%) holding a
bachelor’s degree or higher, 32 (11%) holding an associate degree, and 54 (19%) having
had some college education, leaving 27 (9%) with a high school diploma or less.
Regarding work-related information, 46% percent reported working for their
current organization for 5 or more years, and 22% indicating tenure of 2-5 years. Only
14% indicated tenure of less than one year. 122 (42%) reported being in a role in which
others report to him/her, and the most common Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational
category (Office of Management and Budget, 2018) was Management (15.4%), followed
by Business and Financial Operations (12%). The breakdown of BLS occupations can be
seen in Table 3.
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Table 3. Occupational category breakdown of sample
Occupational category
N
Management
46
Education, Instruction, and Library
37
Business and Financial Operations
35
Office and Administrative Support
25
Sales
23
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical
21
Computer and Mathematical
19
Healthcare Support
17
Transportation and Material Moving
11
Food Preparation and Serving
10
Life, Physical, and Social Science
8
Architecture and Engineering
6
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
6
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media
5
Legal
4
Production
5
Community and Social Service
4
Personal Care and Service
3
Military
3
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance
2
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry
1
Protective Service
0
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%
15.8
12.7
12
8.6
7.9
7.2
6.5
5.8
3.8
3.4
2.7
2.1
2.1
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.4
1
1
0.7
0.3
0

Measures
Unethical pro-organizational behavior vignettes (Appendix A). The six items
from Umphress and colleagues’ (2010) original UPB scale were adapted into vignette
form. This was done for two reasons. First, the vignettes were thought to give participants
more contextual information to make better-informed ratings of moral recognition,
evaluation, behavioral intent, moral intensity, and moral disengagement based on
situational features. Second, because vignettes allowed us to address and account for a
wider range of contextual details, vignettes were expected to increase the likelihood that
participants interpreted each UPB in a way that adheres to the construct definition set
forth by Umphress and Bingham (2011). Presenting the items in their original form may
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have allowed for extraneous variance in ratings due to participants inferring or imagining
situational variables. These differences in interpretation have the potential to not only
morph the scenario’s behavior from a UPB to something else entirely such as an OCB or
compliance behavior, they also could influence their ratings of the behaviors. However,
building the vignettes based on Umphress et al.’s (2010) original items allow us to take
advantage of the scale development and item generation techniques that the researchers
completed in order to determine the most appropriate behaviors to measure.
By adapting the Theory of Planned Behavior (Azjen, 1991), which suggests that
behavioral intention mediates the relationship between determinants - attitudes, norms,
and behavioral control - and the behavior itself, the current study aimed for these
vignettes to in part measure behavioral intentions with the assumption that intentions
would ultimately predict behavior given the same situation. There is some criticism of
using vignettes in unethical behavior research due to the potential for weak intentionsbehavior linkages (Mudrack & Mason, 2013a), largely believed to be due to poorly
designed scenarios (Mudrack & Mason, 2013b) or inaccurate depictions of the real world
(Evans et al., 2015). However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that such a link is
both theoretically and practically substantive (Chang, 1998; Randall & Gibson, 1991),
with many studies finding strong correlations between reported intentions and behavior
(Armitage & Conner, 2001; Stone, Jawahar, & Kisamore, 2009). Further, the use of
personalized information embedded into each vignette in the current study is was
intended to help create a sense of realism within the scenarios, therefore further
strengthening this intention-behavior link.
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Umphress and colleagues (2010; 2011; 2018) specify several parameters that are
necessary for a behavior to be theoretically considered a UPB, which are as follows: 1.)
the behavior must be either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community, 2.)
there must be an intent to benefit the organization in some way, and 3.) the behavior must
be purposeful - accidental or incidental behaviors are not considered UPB, and 4.) the
behavior is not explicitly ordered by management, nor included in a job description.
Thus, information in the vignettes aimed to reflect these parameters.
Further, Umphress and colleagues (2010; 2011; 2018) elaborate on several
situational aspects that are not theoretically relevant when determining if a behavior is or
is not a UPB. Specifically, 1.) there is no specification regarding the behavior’s benefit to
the self, though the co-occurrence of self- and organization-specific benefit is probably
likely 2.) the ultimate result of the behavior is irrelevant, and 3.) the behavior’s
congruence or incongruence with organizational norms is irrelevant. While it is quite
possible that perceptions or expectations related to these details are influential in the
decision-making process, specific mention of these details in our vignettes could have
caused outcome measures to unintentionally capture reactions to these features rather
than features related to the current research question. For instance, a vignette that
explicitly states a salesperson’s expected commission on a fraudulent sale may influence
participants’ endorsement in the salesperson’s decision separately from the predictors of
interest. Therefore, to avoid allowing such details to contaminate participants’
evaluations and ultimate behavioral choices, no information pertaining to the previously
stated details was included. Further, no information regarding pressure, either citizenship
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pressure or in-role pressure, was included or implied. The vignettes in their entirety can
be seen in Appendix A.
UPB Decision- Making. The extent to which a participant agrees with the
behavior being carried out in the vignette was measured by items that aim to reflect the
moral recognition, moral evaluation, and behavioral intent of the ethical decision. This
framework adheres to the four-stage model of ethical decision-making (Rest, 1986), a
widely used model in the literature. These items were borrowed or adapted from previous
research that have also adapted Rest’s framework.
To measure the moral recognition of the UPB, respondents indicated their level of
agreement to the following item: “The scenario presents an ethical problem.” The item
was presented on a 7-point scale. This item is very commonly used when examining
moral recognition of a situation (Leitsch, 2006; May & Pauli, 2002; Sweeney & Costello,
2009).
To measure moral evaluation, the Moral Evaluation Scale (MES; Reidenbach &
Robin, 1990) as validated by Shafer (2008) was used. This scale consists of 6 semantic
differential items: “just/unjust,” “fair/unfair,” “morally right/morally wrong,” “acceptable
to my family/not acceptable to my family,” “culturally acceptable/culturally
unacceptable,” and “traditionally acceptable/traditionally unacceptable.” Respondents
were instructed to indicate on a 7-point scale where each vignette falls according to each
item. This scale is commonly used when examining moral evaluation (McMahon &
Harvey, 2007; Shafer & Simmons, 2011), and is considered an effective tool for moral
evaluation measurement.
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To measure behavioral intent, the following single item was used: “If I were in
this situation, I would have made the same decision.” Several previous studies have
found variations of this item to be an adequate measure of behavioral intent (Leitsch,
2006; May & Pauli, 2002; Sweeney & Costello, 2009). The item was presented on a 7point scale. The final stage of Rest’s model, engagement in the behavior, was not
measured because these are hypothetical scenarios.
Organizational identification (Appendix B). Organizational identification was
measured with the widely used Organizational Identification scale developed by Mael
and Ashforth (1992). This six-item scale instructs participants to rate their level of
agreement on a 1-5 scale. Example items include “The organization’s successes are my
successes,” and “I am very interested in what others think about my organization.”
Citizenship pressure (Appendix C). To assess perceptions of citizenship
pressure, Bolino et al.’s (2010) citizenship pressure scale was used. This scale borrows
behaviors presented in previous instruments that measure three forms of OCB: individual
initiative (Bolino & Turnley, 2005), helping (Settoon & Mossholder, 2002), and loyalty
behaviors (Moorman & Blakely, 1995). Respondents were asked to indicate how often
they feel pressured to engage in these behaviors on a 5-point scale (1 = Never feel
pressured; 5 = Always feel pressured). Thirty-four items were presented in total. Two
example items are “Attend work-related functions on personal time,” and “Participate in
community activities for the benefit of the company or organization.” Scores from the
three subscales were aggregated into one overall citizenship pressure score at the
recommendation of Bolino et al. (2010) in order to examine broad perceptions across all
types of OCBs.
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Moral intensity (Appendix D). Moral intensity was measured by adapting May
and Pauli’s (2002) Moral Intensity scale. For each of the six vignettes, participants
indicated their level of agreement to 16 items addressing all 6 moral intensity
characteristics: magnitude of consequences, probability of effect, proximity, temporal
immediacy, concentration of effect, and social consensus. Each characteristic is
represented by 2 to 4 items and was measured on a 7-point scale. Example items include:
“There is a very small likelihood that my decision will actually cause any harm (reversecoded, probability of effect),” and “my decision will impact my co-workers (proximity).”
Aligning to previous research (Nill & Schibrowsky, 2005; Paolillo & Vitell, 2002)
subdimensions were collapsed into a single score to represent the overall intensity of the
behavior.2
Moral disengagement (Appendix E). To measure moral disengagement
activation, eight items were created specific to each vignette. Each of these items
represented one of the cognitive mechanisms of moral disengagement. Items were
intended to capture potential manifestations of each mechanism according to the specific
details of each vignette. For instance, following a vignette which involves overlooking an
accounting error, example items include “Overlooking the mistake might be worth it to
make sure my company survives and we all keep our jobs (moral justification)” and “If

2

Little consistency has been found in previous research when attempting to factor analyze the moral
intensity construct. For instance, both Leitsch (2006) and Sweeney and Costello (2009) conducted factor
analyses of moral intensity responses, and both studies found substantial inconsistencies in factor loadings
across different scenarios. The current study conducted a similar set of factor analyses and found similar
results, as the factor structure did not remain consistent for any two scenarios. This is not necessarily
problematic – moral intensity components represent perceptions of situational characteristics, so one
wouldn’t expect these perceptions to be correlated any more than one would expect details of different
situations to be correlated.
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nobody else has mentioned it [the accounting mistake], it’s not my place to bring it up
(diffusion of responsibility).” All 48 items can be seen in Appendix E.
Prevention Regulatory Focus (Appendix F). Prevention regulatory focus was
examined using the Neubert, Kacmar, Carlson, and Chonko (2008) Work Regulatory
Focus Questionnaire. This questionnaire consists of two subscales, prevention focus and
promotion focus, and while the current hypothesis only addresses prevention focus, both
subscales were be presented to assist in exploratory analyses. The full scale consists of 18
items presented on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). Example
prevention focus items include “Fulfilling my work duties is very important to me,” and
“At work, I am often focused on accomplishing tasks that will support my need for
security.”
Additional Variables. For exploratory purposes, we assessed other variables that
we suspect relate to likelihood of performing UPB. Ethical climate was measured using
the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (Victor & Cullen, 1988), which consists of 26 items
each on a five-point scale (Appendix G)3. This questionnaire measures perceptions
regarding five different climate types: Caring, Law and Code, Rules, Instrumental, and
Independence. While all five climate types have been shown to influence unethical
choice (Martin & Cullen, 2006), only the Caring and Instrumental climate types were
measured in attempt to minimize rater fatigue and given their relevance to the current
study. The Caring climate type is primarily based around perceptions of ethical climates
being driven by a general sense of concern for the well-being of others in the
organization. This could potentially be relevant to the current study given the core

While Victor and Cullen’s original study uses a six-point scale (0 = Completely False; 5 = Completely
True), the current analysis utilized a five-point scale in order to maintain consistency with other measures.
3
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hypotheses concerning one’s perceived need to provide helpful resources. An example
item is “The most important concern is the good of all the people in the company as a
whole.” In contrast, the Instrumental climate type refers to the perception that selfinterest guides behaviors in the organization, and that decisions should primarily be made
to benefit either one’s personal interests or the interests of the organization. Because the
behaviors measured in the current study tend to involve behaviors that help the
organization at the expense of others, this climate type may be influential. An example
item is “Work is considered substandard only when it hurts the company’s interests.” The
other three climate types, Rules (internal codes of conduct), Law and Code (external
principles held by society, religious groups, or professional groups), and Independence
(personal moral convictions), while valuable, were thought to not be as active in the
current study relationships. This was also determined in part due to findings by
Stachowicz-Stanusch and Simha (2013), who found that Caring and Instrumental were
specifically shown to predict corruption, whereas the other three types did not.
In addition to ethical climate, participants were asked to rate the relevance of each
vignette to their current job. They were instructed to consider the current scenario and
indicate on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) how likely it is
that they might experience a situation similar to the one presented in the scenario. This
item was used for exploratory purposes during analysis.
Procedure
The present study included both within-person and between-person measures (for
a breakdown of which measures are measured at each level, see Table 4). Six vignettes
reflecting UPB were constructed and presented in a randomized order. These vignettes
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correspond to the six self-report items included in the original UPB scale by Umphress
and colleagues (2010). Following each vignette, participants were instructed to respond
to surveys regarding their moral evaluation of the UPB, moral intensity, and moral
disengagement as presented in that vignette (thus, these are within-person measures).
After all vignettes and corresponding scales were presented, participants
completed a filler task that involved word categorization. There were three rounds of
categorization. In the first, participants bucketed a list of 20 words as being real or
fictional words. The second asked participants to bucket names of countries as being real
of fictional. The third asked participants to bucket words as being spelled correctly or
incorrectly. This task was chosen because it was not too cognitively taxing, but still
required enough time to complete that some psychological distance was injected between
the within- and between-person measures, thereby lessening the potential for priming
effects. There was a set time allotment of 3 minutes for each of the three categorization
rounds, so even if a participant finished the task quickly, the time elapsed by the filler
task remained the same across participants. Following the filler task, participants
completed the between-person measures.
Vignettes and questionnaires were presented using Qualtrics, a widely used webbased survey platform. Prior to reading the vignettes, participants were asked to provide a
pseudonym, such as initials, an abbreviation, or a nickname, for their organization. This
pseudonym was then implanted into the vignettes where appropriate using the piping
functionality within Qualtrics. Not only does this retain the original survey items’
reference to the respondent’s organizations, but it also may have helped to generate a
sense of realism for the participants within each vignette. Such realism is beneficial for
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behavioral research using vignettes (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), as it should help to put
the proposed behavior into the social and organizational context which the participant
would realistically encounter. To control for the effect of vignette length, vignettes were
constrained to be between 130 and 170 words.
Table 4. Presentation Order of Study Measures.
Measure
Measurement Level
Inclusion criteria
Between-Person
UPB Decision-Making
Within-Person
Moral Disengagement
Within-Person
Moral Intensity
Within-Person
Organizational Identification
Between-Person
Citizenship Pressure
Between-Person
Prevention Regulatory Focus
Between-Person
Ethical Climate
Between-Person
Demographic Information
Between-Person
Note: The ordering of above measures is reflective of the order which will be
presented to participants. Within-person measures will be measured
iteratively; all three measures will be presented following each vignette.

Pilot Study 1
Because this study used newly created vignettes that have yet to be used in
research, it was necessary to conduct a pilot study in order to ensure the vignettes were
being understood and interpreted correctly, that no unanticipated conclusions or
assumptions were being made when reading them, and that the evaluations of them were
not so one-sided, either positively or negatively, that might attenuate variance in withinperson measures. Thus, a small interview-style pilot study consisting of 5 undergraduate
students was conducted to gauge qualitative reactions to the vignettes. Each participant
read all 6 vignettes, and was asked to respond verbally and open-endedly to a series of
questions regarding the clarity of the vignette, the acceptability of the behavior, thought
processes cognitive justifications that might have motivated the behavior, and thoughts

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

47

on how common the behavior is in daily life. Overall, results were encouraging in that the
vignettes appeared to be interpreted easily and without issue. The acceptability of the
behaviors ranged between 3 and 7 on a 10-point scale, indicating that the behaviors were
seen as moral gray areas. Only two modifications were necessary across all vignettes: a
clarification was added to Vignette 5 regarding one’s expected job duties, and a
clarification was added to Vignette 1 in order to aid in the understanding of the term
“severance.” Otherwise, all vignettes remained as originally written.
Pilot Study 2
While the vignettes are aimed at providing additional situational context that
provides control regarding the correct interpretation of the situation, it is also possible
that the added information could introduce fundamental differences compared to the
Umphress et al. (2010) items from which the vignettes stem. If comparing the vignettes to
the original items as stimuli and differences in scale scores arise, it would be difficult to
identify whether these differences are driven by issues with the vignettes themselves,
such as the interpretation of the content, contextual clues that contaminate ratings, or
method effects triggered by longer stimuli, or if they were due to the items not providing
enough context upon which one could make a fair evaluation. On the other hand, if such
differences are not observed, then it may be the case that the added context of the
vignette is not necessary and that the original items are sufficient to test hypotheses. It is
therefore reasonable to expect there to be moderate intra-scenario consistency across
forms – enough to assure that similar constructs are being measured, but not so much to
negate any value that the vignette approach brings.
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To investigate similarities and differences in rating tendencies in response to
vignettes compared the original items, a second pilot was administered to a classroom of
business major undergraduates (n = 46). Each participant viewed both sets of stimuli
(vignettes and items) in a randomized order (either vignettes first or items first). They
also responded to the within-person UPB decision-making measures and several other
scales that previous research determined were significantly associated with UPB (leadermember exchange, organizational identification, and moral identity).
The aim of the pilot was to examine if there were within- and between-scenario
mean differences across forms for the outcome measures. “Within-scenario mean
differences” would indicate that mean scores on key variables significantly differed
between the vignette and item forms of the same scenario. “Between-scenario mean
differences” would indicate significant variability among the six scenarios in each format.
In addition, “within-scenario correlations” were observed in order to determine the
consistency of respondent rank orders across forms (e.g., even if the mean scores differ,
the rank orders may be consistent). Finally, format-based differences in relationships with
known covariates were also tested, under the assumption that if one form was observed to
have stronger relationships with the covariates than the other, then that form may contain
less noise in the ratings that it produces.
First, we tested for within-scenario mean differences (between the item score and
the vignette score for the same scenario) using Student’s T-test. Results indicated that
there were some mean differences in within-scenario scores for moral recognition. Two
of the 6 scenarios demonstrated significant differences, and 3 of the remaining 4 were
trending towards significance. In all cases, the original items were less recognized as a
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moral dilemma (m = 4.10) compared to the vignettes (m = 4.86). A possible cause for
these differences is that the vignettes may generally be providing the reader with the
additional context necessary to recognize the behaviors as immoral, whereas the original
items are vaguer and may be more difficult to determine if actual violations took place.
There were no significant mean differences observed between formats for the other
outcomes (moral evaluation and behavioral intent).
Table 5. Pilot study 2 mean differences across formats
Moral Recognition
Moral Evaluation
Scenario Vign. Item
Vign. Item
diff
diff
1
4.63
3.96
0.67
4.71
4.89
-0.18
2
4.72
4.00
4.42
4.66
0.72
-0.24
3
4.87
4.28
0.59
4.86
4.89
-0.03
4
4.89
3.87 1.02*
5.17
5.48
-0.31
5
5.20
3.98 1.22*
5.64
5.96
-0.32
6
4.87
4.46
0.41
5.20
4.66
0.54
Total
4.86
4.10 0.77*
5.00
5.09
-0.09
Note: * indicates p < .05.

Behavioral Intent
Vign. Item
diff
3.50
3.63 -0.13
3.91
3.96 -0.05
3.52
3.96 -0.44
2.93
3.37 -0.44
2.91
2.70
0.21
3.15
3.93 -0.78
3.32
3.52 -0.27

In observing within-scenario/between form correlations, an interesting finding
was that only moral evaluation produced a significant correlation between forms. Thus,
only for moral evaluation was the rank order significantly consistent. This indicates that
there could be some substantial difference in how these stimuli are being interpreted in
regard to moral recognition and behavioral intent, at least for some individuals.
Finally, relationships with known covariates were assessed, which was thought to
help indicate the source of any deviation between forms. Unfortunately, however, no
significant relationships with these covariates were found for either the vignettes or the
items. While the results of this pilot were surprising, they were not necessarily bad – it is
quite possible that mean differences in ratings as well as a lack of consistency across
forms could be indicative that context of the vignette is helping to control for any
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contaminating thought processes. However, given the inconclusive results, we decided to
collect further data. As previously mentioned, in the main study, a subsample of the study
sample (one-third) was administered the item formats instead of the vignettes. Effects of
form will be observed again with the full sample. Hypothesis testing, however, will be
done using only those that were administered the vignettes.
Results
Means and standard deviations of all scales can be seen in Table 6, and
correlations and reliability coefficients can be seen in Table 7. Because multiple vignettes
were presented to each participant, it was necessary to evaluate whether any vignettes
were being rated substantially differently than the others on the within-person measures.
While some deviation is expected as the context of each scenario differs, scores that
deviated too greatly from the within-person mean, or scenarios that lacked variance,
could indicate that the behavior in the scenario is too immoral or too benign in order to
produce enough variance to test hypotheses. Further, low consistency with the other
scales may indicate that reactions to the problematic vignette are contaminated by some
other unexpected construct beyond what is currently being measured. Therefore, for each
within-person scale, an ANOVA was conducted to evaluate differences in scores by
vignette. When examining patterns of the results, scenario 5 (ignoring a billing mistake)
appeared to be rated as a more severe moral violation than the others.
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Table 6. Scale means (standard deviations)
Scenario
Overall 1
2
3
4
5
6
Moral Recognition
5.84
5.56c
5.66c
6.04ab 5.70bc 6.19a
5.90bc
(0.78)
(1.28) (1.29) (0.95) (1.30) (1.21) (1.24)
Moral Evaluation
5.40
5.16c
5.12c
5.46b
5.21bc 5.91a
5.53b
(0.97)
(1.42) (1.47) (1.28) (1.37) (1.21) (1.32)
Behavioral Intent
2.98
2.95b
3.20ab 3.00ab 3.38a
2.57c
2.75bc
(1.23)
(1.72) (1.88) (1.75) (1.91) (1.82) (1.70)
Moral
2.84
3.03ab 2.87b
2.91ab 3.09a
2.34d
2.63c
Disengagement
(0.69)
(0.84) (0.94) (0.88) (0.86) (1.10) (0.80)*
Moral Intensity
3.06
2.68c
2.99b
3.10b
3.01b
3.15b
3.47a
(0.56)
(0.81) (0.84) (0.77) (0.78) (0.80) (0.77)
Org. Identification
3.37
(1.06)
Citizenship Pressure 2.61
(0.84)
Regulatory Focus
4.15
(Prevention)
(0.57)
Ethical Climate
3.54
(Caring)
(0.71)
Ethical Climate
2.89
(Instrumental)
(0.86)
Note: Moral Recognition, Moral Evaluation, and Behavioral Intent utilized a 7-item
scale. All other measures utilized a 5-item scale.
*These values reflect this scale after one item was removed based on factor analysis
results.
Values that share like superscripts a,b,c,d are not significantly different (p < .05) from one
another. Differing superscripts indicate significant differences (p < .05), with a denoting
the highest values and d denoting the lowest values.

Table 7. Correlations
Variable

1

1. Org. Identification

(.91)

2. Citizenship Pressure

.12*

(.96)

3. Prev. Reg. Focus

.31**

-.03

(.83)

4. Moral Recognition

-.08

-.15**

.07

5. Moral Evaluation

-.13*

-.11

-.03

.54**

6. Behavioral Intent

.15*

.18**

.00

-.46** -.70**

7. Moral Intensity

-.05

.00

.01

.36**

.61**

-.67**

(.93)

8. Moral
Disengagement

.04

.15*

.03

-.39** -.62**

.80**

-.72**

(.84)

.41**

-.08

.40**

-.06

.05

-.13*

9. Eth. Clim. – Caring

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-

-.04

(.95)

.03

-

(.78)

10. Eth. Clim. -.13* .43**
.01
-.06
-.10
.22**
-.08
.24** -.19** (.83)
Instrumental
11. CMV – computer
.07
-.18** .17** .20**
.07
-.06
.05
.00
.07
-.04
(.92)
self-eff.
12. CMV – desirable
.04
-.20**
.08
.06
.19** -.27** .23** -.36** .28** -.12*
.12*
(.86)
resp.
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. The diagonal contains coefficient alpha values. For within-person measures
(moral evaluation, moral intensity, and moral disengagement), average coefficient alphas are shown. Because moral
recognition and behavioral intent are single-item indicators, no coefficient alpha scores are shown.

While significant deviation across scenarios is not necessarily problematic, the
scenario was reviewed to inspect for potential features that may have caused the higher
scores on moral intensity. The vignette concerns choosing to ignore a billing mistake in
which a client was overcharged. It is possible that because this vignette directly involves
a financial loss, rather than a more interpersonal violation as with exaggerating during a
sales pitch, the immorality of the behavior may appear more quantifiable and therefore be
more difficult to ignore. While steps were taken in the vignette to minimize
contamination, such as omitting the true dollar amount of the charge and specifying the
billing error as not directly tied to the reader’s job, it is possible that this vignette is being
evaluated in a fundamentally different way because of these issues. More information
would be needed to understand for certain. To examine the extent to which scenario 5
followed the same response patterns as the others, we computed scenario-total
correlations (akin to item-total correlations in a traditional scale). Encouragingly, the
scenario-total correlations for vignette 5 were comparable to those of the other vignettes.
while the distribution of responses differed from the other scenarios, correlations with the
remaining scenarios were uniform with other vignettes, therefore indicating consistency
among response patterns across scenarios (see Table 8). The vignette was therefore
retained in the current analysis.
Table 8. Scenario-total correlations
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
Moral Recognition
.37
.41
.54
.51
.46
.38
Moral Evaluation
.52
.67
.68
.61
.54
.47
Behavioral Intent
.51
.61
.63
.51
.48
.40
Moral Disengagement
.64
.69
.73
.62
.63
.56
Moral Intensity
.37
.67
.66
.64
.57
.44
Note: Each score represents the correlation between a measure score for a particular
scenario and the remaining scores for the same measure across the rest of the scenarios.
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Common Method Variance
Given the survey length, morally sensitive content, and cross-sectional design,
common method variance was heavily considered. A three-pronged approach
recommended by Williams and McGonagle (2016) was utilized. This approach
incorporates 1) including and controlling for a measured marker variable (a variable
thought to be conceptually unrelated to the focal variables, but measured using the same
approach), 2) including and controlling for a direct measure of a hypothesized source of
method variance, and 3) modeling an unmeasured latent variable reflecting method
variance. These three techniques are frequently used in research independently; however,
Williams and McGonagle recommended applying a combined, “hybrid” approach in
attempt to account for different kinds of method variance at once. The approach, which
builds upon similar approaches by Williams, Hartman, and Cavazotte (2010) and
Rafferty and Griffin (2004), involves a series of nested CFA models. This sequence of
models is used to identify the extent to which method variance is playing a part in the
relationships between scales, and if such is the case, pinpointing which type or types of
method variance are evident. In the current study, the marker variable used was computer
self-efficacy (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; see Appendix I) due to no theoretical rationale
for it to be correlated with any of the study variables. The measured cause variable
selected was social desirability (Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015; see Appendix J)
due to its frequent use as a control variable in ethical decision-making research (Burnett,
2017; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Thau et al., 2015) in order to target bias in responses due to
impression management (Greco, O’Boyle, & Walter, 2015).
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The large number of within-person measures (which would have to be modeled
separately for each of the scenarios) posed a problem in terms of necessary power
required to model the large number of parameter estimates that a full model would
require. Therefore, it was necessary to select a subset of variables for inclusion in the
CMV model. To select variables, correlations were assessed in order to identify the
variables that seemed to show the greatest CMV effects. These correlations can be seen
in Table 7. While computer self-efficacy was largely unrelated to substantive variables,
social desirability had strong correlations with many substantive variables, particularly
with those that measure moral constructs. The strongest correlation was between social
desirability and aggregated moral disengagement (average moral disengagement across
the scenarios; r = -.36, p < .01). Constructs less related to moral decision-making
(prevention regulatory focus, organizational identification, etc.) did not have as strong
correlations. We chose to focus on the variables that seemed to have the greatest CMV
effects in order to gauge an upper bound on the extent to which CMV may affect the
relationships of interest. We therefore included the following variables in our CMV
analysis: moral evaluation, moral disengagement, and moral intensity.
As an additional way to increase power, moral intensity, which includes 15 items,
was parceled using the item-to-construct balancing technique (Little, Cunningham,
Shahar, & Widaman, 2002), which buckets items into parcels according to the rank order
of factor loadings. Three parcels were created, dropping the number of indicators for
moral intensity down from 15 to 3. As a final note, rather than perform this analysis six
times across the six scenarios, we focused on the scenarios with the strongest (scenario 3)
and weakest (scenario 6) relationships between the moral constructs being included in the
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analysis (moral disengagement, moral intensity, and moral evaluation), and social
desirability. This should help us gauge an upper and lower bound for the degree of CMV
distortion in the relationships, with the assumption that CMV for the other four scenarios
will fall within the range.
To walk through the steps, results from scenario 3 will be presented. The full set
of results for the CMV tests can be seen in Table 9 for scenario 3 and Table 10 for
scenario 6. Williams and McGonagle’s approach involves four main stages, each of
which will be discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. A general overview
of the steps is that: first, a “measurement model” is built to obtain factor loading and
error variances for method indicators. Next, a baseline model is built to act as a
comparison for future models. Following this baseline model, a series of models
iteratively fixing specific parameters incrementally pinpoint which source(s) of method
variance is influential and where. This step includes testing whether method effects are
consistent across items within the same scale, whether they are consistent across scales,
and whether latent variable relationships were impacted. Finally, method influence is
quantified for both variance in indicators as well as latent variables.
The first model, the measurement model, resembles a typical factor analysis
model in which all indicators, method and substantive, load onto their respective latent
factors, which are allowed to covary (χ2 (df) = 2287.83 (855)). Typical checks regarding
discriminant validity (no factor correlations above .80) were satisfied, and while
maximizing fit is not critical, fit indices was still checked to ensure that no substantial
issues exist.
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The next model built was a “baseline model,” which was used as a comparison for
subsequent models. The baseline model includes two modifications: first, the method
factor loadings and error variances were fixed to the values obtained from the
measurement model in step 1. This is done so in order to “lock in” the observed impact of
our method indicators on latent method variables. Second, the method latent variables
were made orthogonal to substantive latent variables in order to simplify the partitioning
of indicator variance in a future step and aid in model identification (χ2 (df) = 2322.81
(909)).
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Figure 3
Final model retained (model CIUU) from CMV analysis for scenario 3.
Note: factor loadings linking the substantive indicators and social desirability latent variable
are constrained to equal within-measures.

The several models that followed involve iteratively allowing both freely
estimated substantive indicators and the fixed method indicators to load onto each latent
method variable, one method variable at a time. Comparisons are then made with the
previous model, and if fit improves whenever indicators are allowed to load onto both
substantive and method factors (and therefore allow for both factors to explain indicator
variance), then it is concluded that an effect of the method variable present as it is
partially influencing substantive indicators scores. The new model is then retained for
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future comparisons. If fit does not improve or worsens, then it can be concluded that no
CMV is present. Substantive indicators were linked first to only the measured cause
variable (model CU, with “C” denoting the Measured Cause variable of social
desirability, and “U” denoting the “unconstrained” method suggested by Williams et al.
(2010)), social desirability, in order to observe its unique impact. Fit of model CU
improved compared to baseline (Δχ2 (Δdf) = -77.41 (-18), p < .001), thus, model CU was
retained, and it was concluded that a significant effect of social desirability on substantive
scores was present. This same approach was repeated for the marker variable (model
MU, with “M” denoting the marker variable), computer self-efficacy, but no significant
improvement of fit was found (Δχ2 (Δdf) = -27.67 (-18), p = .07). Finally, the approach
was taken with an unmeasured latent variable (model UU, with “U” denoting the
unmeasured variable), and fit again improved (Δχ2 (Δdf) = -312.82 (-42), p < .001). Thus,
model UU, which allows each substantive indicator to load onto the measured cause and
unmeasured variable, but not the marker variable, was retained.
Before continuing, it should be noted that Williams and McGonagle’s original
article recommends that the previous step involve loading only the substantive indicators
onto the unmeasured method variable. However, doing so in the current study would
create an interpretational problem, in that the 3 substantive variables currently being used
are very highly correlated with one another. Estimating an unmeasured variable made up
of only shared variance between three highly correlated factors would likely capture a
substantial amount of substantive variance as well, rather than method alone (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). The impact of method is therefore conflated with
substantive relationships and is therefore difficult to accurately identify. To correct for
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this, the previous model (UU) linked substantive indicators as well as marker indicators
and measured cause indicators to the unmeasured method variable. Doing so should give
a less biased estimate of method effects as it captures shared variance across all scales,
rather than the substantive measures alone. In addition, the unmeasured method variable
was made orthogonal to the marker and measured cause method variables in order to
force any shared variance to appear through the items. Similar adjustments regarding the
unmeasured method variable were made in all future models.
Next, we tested whether method effects were equal for all items within the same
scale. In a similar iterative approach as the previous step, the substantive indicators
loading onto each method variable are constrained to be equal within substantive
measures (in other words, all moral intensity indicators loading onto social desirability
are constrained to equal, and the same goes for moral disengagement and moral
evaluation). If constraining the model in this way does not produce a significant decrease
in model fit, as measured by change in chi-square, then the model effects are said to be
equal. This test of equality is only done for the method variables that were deemed
influential from the previous set of models (in this case, the measured cause variable of
social desirability and the unmeasured variable). For social desirability (model CIUU,
with “CI” indicating the “intermediate” step being applied to the measured cause variable
of social desirability), constraining the factor loadings to be equal did not result in worse
fit (Δχ2 (Δdf) = 20.16 (15), p = .17), suggesting that the effects of social desirability were
equal across items.
However, when this test was repeated for the unmeasured method factor (model
CIUI, with UI indicating the “intermediate” step being applied to the unmeasured
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variable), fit significantly worsened (Δχ2 (Δdf) = 275.65 (38), p < .001). Thus, the effects
of the unmeasured sources of method variance significantly differed across items. We
therefore reverted back to the previous model (CIUU) in which the equality constraints
are in place for social desirability but not in place for the unmeasured variable. According
to Williams et al. (2010), upon rejection of this null, researchers can examine the
unconstrained standardized loadings from the previous model (in which equality
constraints were not in place for the unmeasured variable) to get a better understanding of
the difference in factor loadings. In this case, the largest range of within-measure factor
loadings that load onto the unmeasured variable was .64 (moral evaluation), indicating
inconsistent method effects of the unmeasured variable when being freely estimated.
Next, between-factor equality constraints were tested for the remaining method
effect, social desirability. This model tested whether social desirability had an equivalent
effect on each of the substantive variables. Specifically, factor loadings linking
substantive indicators and the social desirability method factor were constrained to equal
within and between substantive factors in order to assess if method effects are impacting
substantive variables equally. When compared against the within-factor equality
constraint model, fit significantly worsened (Δχ2 (Δdf) = 29.52 (2), p < .001), indicating
that method effects were significantly different across substantive variables. Standardized
factor loadings for the items onto the social desirability factor ranged from .13 to .25.

Table 9. Common Method Variance Model Comparisons – Scenario 3
Model
Description
Comparison
Measurement Link all indicators to their respective factors.

χ2 (df)

Δχ2 (Δdf)

2287.83 (855)

Baseline

Fix method factor loadings and error variances to
that of measurement model. Fix substantivemethod variable correlations to zero.

CU

Estimate paths from MC method factor to all
substantive indicators.

Baseline vs. CU

2245.40 (891)

-77.41 (-18)***

MU

Estimate paths from MC and marker method
factors to all substantive indicators.

CU vs. MU

2217.73 (873)

-27.67 (-18)

UU

Estimate paths from MC and unmeasured method
factors to all substantive indicators.

CU vs. UU

1932.59 (849)

-312.81 (-42)***

CIUU

Fix MC method factor loadings for substantive
indicators to equal within-measures.

UU vs. CIUU

1952.75 (864)

20.16 (15)

CIUI

Fix MC and unmeasured method factor loadings
for substantive indicators to equal withinmeasures.

CIUU vs. CIUI

2228.40 (902)

275.65 (38)***

CCUU

Fix MC method factor loadings for substantive
indicators to equal within- and betweenmeasures.

CIUU vs. CCUU

1982.27 (866)

29.52 (2)***

R

Fix substantive factor correlations to that of the
baseline model

CIUU vs. R

1954.60 (867)

1.85 (3)

2322.81 (909)

Note: * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001.
MC = Measured Cause.
Bolded model in comparison indicates the model retained according to the comparison.

Table 10. Common Method Variance Model Comparisons – Scenario 6
Model
Description
Comparison
Measurement Link all indicators to their respective factors.

χ2 (df)

Δχ2 (Δdf)

2203.53 (814)

Baseline

Fix method factor loadings and error variances to
that of measurement model. Fix substantivemethod variable correlations to zero.

CU

Estimate paths from MC method factor to all
substantive indicators.

Baseline vs. CU

2160.89 (851)

-64.20 (-17)***

MU

Estimate paths from MC and marker method
factors to all substantive indicators.

CU vs. MU

2138.82 (834)

-22.07 (-17)

UU

Estimate paths from MC and unmeasured method
factors to all substantive indicators.

CU vs. UU

1850.06 (810)

-310.82 (-41)***

CIUU

Fix MC method factor loadings for substantive
indicators to equal within-measures.

UU vs. CIUU

1913.58 (824)

63.52 (14)***

CUUI

Fix unmeasured method factor loadings for
substantive indicators to equal within-measures.

UU vs. CUUI

2077.35 (847)

227.28 (37)***

R

Fix substantive factor correlations to that of the
baseline model

UU vs. R

1855.55 (813)

5.48 (3)

2225.09 (868)

Note: * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001.
MC = Measured Cause.
Bolded model in comparison indicates the model retained according to the comparison.
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Next, we tested whether CMV significantly influenced the relationships among
substantive variables. To do so, we fixed the substantive factor correlations to those
observed in the baseline model and compared the model fit against our previous model,
in which the CMV factors were permitted to influence the correlations. A significant
decrease in fit indicates that the factor correlations were significantly impacted by CMV.
This would indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in the correlations
when CMV was controlled for versus when it was not. For our model, no significant
decrease in fit was found (Δχ2 (Δdf) = 1.85 (3), p = .60), indicating a lack of bias in the
substantive correlations. When comparing the unconstrained correlations of the previous
model, the largest change in correlation was .057 (moral evaluation and moral intensity;
from r = .62 in the unconstrained model to r = .57 in the fixed model), while the smallest
change was .01 (moral disengagement and moral intensity; r = -.80 in the unconstrained
model vs. r = -.78 in the fixed model).
Given these results were in reference to scenario 3, which had the highest Pearson
correlations between social desirability and the three substantive variables, it is therefore
quite likely that the presence of method effects is similar or lesser for the other scenarios.
This is reiterated by the fact that scenario 6 was also tested, which had the lowest
correlations among social desirability and substantive variables. Results of the CMV
analysis for scenario 6 were similar to that of scenario 3, with the main difference being
that fixing the substantive indicators loading onto social desirability to equal (CIUU)
resulted in worse fit than when they were freely estimated, indicating that the impact of
social desirability was not equal within measures. When examining the impact on
substantive correlations, again no significant impact was found. These results seem to
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suggest that, compared to scenario 3, the influence of method effects for scenario 6 are
not as influential given the lack of consistent impact within-measures. This is also
consistent with the fact that social desirability had lower correlations with scenario 6
measures compared to scenario 3 measures. While method variance appeared to be
present in responses across both scenarios, substantive relationships were not
substantially affected.
Finally, the impact of CMV is quantified for both scenarios, both in terms of the
variance in the substantive indicators accounted for as well as in the substantive latent
variables. To examine variance accounted for in substantive indicators, standardized
factor loadings linking each indicator with method factors were averaged for each
substantive variable. Results can be seen in Table 11. In general, the unmeasured variable
does appear to account for a substantial amount of variance in the moral evaluation
measure, but not beyond what previous research has shown (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, &
Paine, 1999; Williams & McGonagle, 2016). It should be noted however, that the method
effects may be more impactful on moral evaluation than the other two measures.
Table 11. Percent of variance accounted for by latent method variables
Social Desirability
Unmeasured
Substantive
Scenario:
3
6
3
6
Indicators
Moral Evaluation
4.3%
5.0%
22.6%
24.2%
Moral
5.5%
3.9%
3.8%
2.9%
Disengagement
Moral Intensity
1.7%
4.0%
4.5%
4.5%
Note: Marker Variable not shown as retained model did not link substantive
indicators to marker variable for either scenario.
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To examine variance accounted for in the latent variables, composite reliability
(coefficient omega, ω) scores were calculated. These reliabilities allow us to decompose
the reliability estimate to determine how much of the reliability of the substantive latent
variable is due to either the substantive or method variances (Viladrich, Angulo-Brunet,
& Doval, 2017). For both scenarios, the unmeasured variable accounted for a substantial
amount of the reliability estimate for moral evaluation (ω = .23 for both scenarios),
indicating that nearly a quarter of the moral evaluation score appears to be driven not by
the moral evaluation latent construct, but by the unmeasured construct. Social desirability
had relatively little impact on all three latent variables.
Table 12. Reliability decomposition
Social Desirability
3
6
.07
.08
.10
.07

Unmeasured
3
6
.23
.23
.05
.04

Substantive Indicator
Scenario:
Moral Evaluation
Moral
Disengagement
Moral Intensity
.02
.04
.05
.05
Note: Coefficient omegas shown. Marker Variable not shown as retained model did
not link substantive indicators to marker variable for either scenario.

Overall, the results of this CMV analysis suggest that there is evidence that at
least some amount of method effects are present. Regarding social desirability, strong
correlations were found with the three constructs of moral intensity, moral evaluation,
and moral disengagement. This is not surprising and parallels other research involving
moral decision-making (Thau, et al., 2015; Zuber & Kaptein, 2014). CFA models that
allowed for substantive indicators to load onto the social desirability method factor
obtained better fit than those that did not, indicating that a significant portion of
substantive variance can be attributed to social desirability. In addition, the extent to
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which social desirability impacts item responses seems to depend on the scenario, since
scenario 3 (which had the highest correlations with social desirability) saw more uniform
impact of social desirability within-measures, while impact on items was inconsistent in
scenario 6 (which had the lowest correlations with social desirability). Despite
substantive factor correlations not being impacted by method variance, the fact that both
scenarios saw social desirability as influential on responses as well as strong correlations
with substantive variables encourage us to include social desirability as a control variable
for all hypothesis testing.
The marker variable of computer self-efficacy did not appear to have any
influence on responses. According to Lindell and Whitney (2001), the marker variable is
most adept at identifying method variance attributed to measurement-specific influences,
such as the order of measures, the format of the measurement tool, the content of the
items, and other influences, and not necessarily responding in a particularly motivated
way. This gives us confidence that such measurement-related issues are not at play here.
Finally, the unmeasured marker variable appears to influence both indicator
variance and latent variable variance. While an advantage of this approach is that it
allows for the modeling of item-level covariances not attributable to the covariance of the
substantive constructs, this can also act as disadvantage in that it is unclear what specific
construct is driving the covariance. In attempt to more further isolate effects of method
alone, the current study modified Williams and McGonagle’s approach to link marker
and measured cause method indicators onto the unmeasured variable in addition to the
substantive indicators. This was thought to prevent substantive covariance between the
highly correlated study variables to inflate the presumed effect of the unmeasured
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variable. After doing so, the effect of the unmeasured variable seen currently is relatively
consistent with or lower than other research utilizing the unmeasured approach
(MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Paine, 1999; Williams & McGonagle, 2016), and considering
the substantive correlations were not significantly influenced, we can conclude that these
method effects do not compromise the findings of the current study.
Check for Order Effects
The order of the vignettes was randomized for each participant, so we therefore
checked for order effects (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Montoya et al., 2017). For example,
the vignettes presented near the beginning may be rated as more egregious as the
vignettes presented near the end. There may also be effects of fatigue given many of the
measures between vignettes are identical and therefore repetitive. To test if order effects
were evident, six MANOVAs were conducted, one for each scenario, with order position
predicting each of the within-person measures of moral recognition, evaluation,
behavioral intent, moral disengagement, and moral intensity.
Prior to examining the relationships, the assumption of correlated outcomes was
checked and satisfied. The assumption of equal covariance matrices was checked as well
using Box’s M Test, which 3 of the 6 scenarios (scenario 1, 5, and 6) failed. According to
Cohen (2008), the conservatism of Box’s M Test may lead to overly stringent results and
therefore Type I error. They recommend confirming the assumption violation with
Bartlett’s Test, which is not as conservative. Bartlett’s Test was examined for each
individual ANOVA rather than the MANOVA models, and while moral evaluation and
behavioral intent ANOVAs were non-significant, all 3 moral recognition ANOVAs were
significant, indicating unequal variances for moral recognition responses across scenarios
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and therefore violating the equality of covariance assumption. The MANOVAs for
scenarios 1, 5, and 6 therefore excluded the moral recognition outcome. The moral
recognition outcomes for these three scenarios were tested independently as ANOVAs,
and all were non-significant.
Due to six unique MANOVAs being tested, each with 15 unique contrasts being
made, the potential for Type I error is increased. The alpha cut-off for these tests was
therefore adjusted to .01 based on a Bonferroni correction, which divides alpha by the
number of tests being conducted (6). After applying this correction, results showed that
all MANOVAs were non-significant, with only scenario 2 nearing significance (Pillai’s =
.093, df = 5, p = .02). It is therefore reasonable to proceed under the assumption that
order position does not appear to have any substantial impact on response patterns.
Hypothesis Testing
To test Hypothesis 1, a person-level linear regression with the control variable of
social desirability and organizational identification as predictors and citizenship pressure
as the outcome was examined. Results indicated a significant relationship (β = .10, p <
.05). Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Table 13. Regression of citizenship pressure on organizational identification
Predictor
B
95% CI
beta
r
R2
(Intercept)
3.02***
[2.51, 3.54]
Social Desirability
-0.18**
[-0.27, -0.08]
-0.20
-.20**
Org. Identification
0.10*
[0.01, 0.19]
0.13
.12*
R2 = .056**
Note. * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001

To test Hypothesis 2, the relationship between citizenship pressure and UPB
decision-making while controlling for social desirability, three separate multilevel
regressions were carried out between citizenship pressure and the within-person measures
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of UPB decision-making: moral recognition, moral evaluation, and behavioral intent.
After intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) suggested significant variation in
intercepts due to person-level differences, random intercepts models, or models which
allow for intercepts of the citizenship pressure-UPB decision-making relationships to
vary between groups, were fit. While controlling for social desirability, significant
relationships were found for moral recognition (γ = -.13, p < .01) and behavioral intent (γ
= .19, p < .01), such that stronger perceptions of citizenship pressure were associated
with a lower tendency to recognize scenarios as moral violations and a higher willingness
to engage in the behavior. The relationship with moral evaluation was not significant (γ =
-.09, p = .19). Thus, partial support was found for Hypothesis 2.
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Table 14. Hypothesis 2: Moral recognition, moral evaluation, and behavioral intent
regressed onto citizenship pressure
Null
Random Intercepts
Predictor
Estimate
SE
p
Estimate
SE
p
Moral Recognition
Intercept
5.84
.05
< .001
5.73
.21
< .001
Social Desirability
.03
.05
.57
Citizenship Pressure
-.13
.05
< .01
AIC
5488.29
5493.41
.42
.41
τ00
2
1.10
1.10
σ
ICC
.27
Moral Evaluation
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
AIC

τ00
σ2
ICC
Behavioral Intent
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
AIC

τ00
σ2
ICC

5.40

.06

< .001

4.64
.18
-.09
5648.72
.72
1.13

.26
.06
.07

< .001
< .001
.19

.07

< .001

4.28
-.30
.19
6689.41
1.04
2.13

.32
.07
.08

< .001
< .001
< .01

5650.17
.76
1.13
.40

2.98

6705.29
1.17
2.13
.35

Note: Social desirability and citizenship pressure were grand-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals

Hypothesis 3, which proposed a positive relationship between citizenship pressure
and moral disengagement, was tested using a multilevel regression, with citizenship
pressure and the social desirability control variable as predictors and the within-person
measure of moral disengagement as the outcome. After ICC scores determined there was
evidence of substantial variation across persons, the citizenship pressure-moral
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disengagement relationship, controlling for social desirability, was found to be not
significant (γ = .06, p = .16). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Table 15. Hypothesis 3: Moral disengagement regressed onto citizenship pressure
Null
Random Intercepts
Predictor
Estimate
SE
p
Estimate
SE
p
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
AIC

2.81

.04

< .001

3.86
-.24
.06
4226.13
.34
.50

.18
.04
.05

< .001
< .001
.16

4254.68
.40
τ00
2
.50
σ
ICC
.44
Note: Social desirability and citizenship pressure were grand-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals

Hypothesis 4 proposed that prevention regulatory focus would moderate the
relationship of citizenship pressure with moral disengagement. To test this hypothesis, a
hierarchical, multilevel regression was conducted including the control variable of social
desirability, the citizenship pressure and prevention regulatory focus variables, and their
interaction term. Prior to testing the relationship, collinearity between predictors was
checked and was satisfactory (tolerance scores did not fall below .90).
Block 1 of the regression represented the null model, which included no
predictors and examined if moral disengagement scores varied due to person (similar to
an ANOVA). Substantial person-level variation was found in moral disengagement, thus
necessitating the use multilevel modeling. Block 2 contained a random intercepts model
that included the control variable of social desirability, citizenship pressure, and
prevention regulatory focus. Block 3 contained a random intercepts model that introduced
the interaction term of citizenship pressure and prevention regulatory focus. Results can
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be seen in Table 16. The interaction term was non-significant (γ = -.04, p = .58).
Hypothesis 4 was therefore not supported.
Table 16. Hypothesis 4: Prevention regulatory focus moderating the relationship
between citizenship pressure and moral disengagement
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Predictor
Est. SE
p
Est. SE
p
Est. SE
p
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
Prev. Reg. Focus
Citizenship Pressure
× Prev. Reg. Focus
AIC

2.81

.04

< .001

3.87
-.25
.07
.07

.18
.04
.05
.07

< .001
< .001
.16
.30

3.88
-.25
.07
.07
-.04

.18
.04
.05
.07
.08

< .001
< .001
.13
.33
.58

4254.68
4230.63
4235.57
.34
.40
.34
.50
.50
.50
ICC
.44
Note: Social desirability, citizenship pressure, and prevention regulatory focus were
grand-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals

τ00
σ2

Hypothesis 5 proposed that moral disengagement would mediate the relationship
between citizenship pressure and UPB decision-making. Because both the mediator and
the outcome of this analysis were measured within-person, a multilevel 2-1-1 mediation
model was specified, with moral disengagement and UPB decision-making entered at
level 1 and citizenship pressure as well as the social desirability control variable entered
at level 2. Following the recommendations made by Pituch and Stapleton (2012) and
Tofighi and Thoemmes (2014), within-group and between-group effects were separated
out by group-mean centering the mediator and reintroducing the group mean as a level 2
predictor. In other words, the participant’s deviation from their own mean score on moral
disengagement was entered at level 1, and the participant’s mean score for moral
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disengagement was entered at level 2. This procedure allows for the estimation of both
within- and between-person indirect effects.
While there is some debate in the literature regarding the existence of bias in
within-person indirect effects in 2-1-1 mediation models, Pituch and Stapleton (2012)
argue that this approach is viable as long as the a path of the mediation (the path from the
predictor to the mediator) is estimated separately using the uncentered level 1 mediator
variable (i.e., in a separate analysis). This is necessary because person-centering the
mediator variable for the estimation of the a path would set the person-level mediator
means (a path outcomes) to zero, resulting in an a path estimate of zero as well as an
indirect effect estimate of zero (see indirect effect equation below). Using an uncentered
mediator allows for the estimation of the a path as the person-level means are allowed to
vary. The centered mediator (moral disengagement) can then be entered into the
separately estimated b path (the path from the moral disengagement to UPB decisionmaking). In addition, the person-level moral disengagement mean will be entered into the
b path calculation as well. Adding each participant’s mean score on moral disengagement
as a level 2 predictor partials out the effects of between-person differences in mean levels
of moral disengagement. This, then, isolates the effects of within-person variance in
moral disengagement (i.e., deviations from the individual’s own mean level of moral
disengagement). A within-person indirect effect can then be estimated using:
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑤 = 𝑎𝑏𝑤
where a represents the unstandardized path from citizenship pressure to moral
disengagement (which, as we mentioned, should be calculated using a separate equation),
and bw represents the unstandardized within-group path of moral disengagement to the
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outcome. Confidence intervals for this effect can then be computed using the path
estimates and standard errors. To measure the between-person indirect effect (i.e., the
indirect effect associated with between-person differences in mean levels of moral
disengagement), an identical approach can be used, substituting the bb in for bw in order to
indicate the between-group b path (Pituch & Stapleton, 2012; Zhang, Zyphur, &
Preacher, 2009). Thus, two indirect effects are involved with this hypothesis – one in
which within-person deviations from one’s own mean level of moral disengagement is
the mediator, and one in which between-person differences in mean levels of moral
disengagement is the mediator.
Three mediation models were assessed – one for each outcome measure. Prior to
each model, null models were built to ensure that enough variation between persons was
present to necessitate a multilevel approach, and this assumption was not surprisingly
satisfied for each outcome. To estimate a path (identical across each model), the
following equation was adopted using an uncentered level 1 mediator variable serving as
the outcome:
𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑍𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑋𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
where γ01Zj represents the control variable of social desirability, and γ02Xj represents the
citizenship pressure predictor. This unstandardized estimate of the a path was γ02 = .06 (p
= .16), indicating a non-significant relationship between citizenship pressure and level 2
moral disengagement when controlling for social desirability. (This path is identical to
the one tested in Hypothesis 3).
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Next, the full model, assuming random intercepts and fixed slopes, was fit for
each outcome using the following:
Level 1: 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑀𝑗 ) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗
Level 2: 𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑍𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑋𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑀𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10
…and subsequently tested against a random slopes model, which allows for slopes to
vary across persons by adding an error term for the slope of the mediator:
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝑢1𝑗
Results indicated the model allowing for random slopes was a better fitting model
for all three outcomes (moral recognition: Δχ2 (Δdf) = 26.36 (2), p < 001; moral
evaluation: Δχ2 (Δdf) = 119.45 (2), p < 001; behavioral intent: Δχ2 (Δdf) = 37.57 (2), p <
001). The variance in slopes τ11 was estimated at .19, .16, and .18 for moral recognition,
moral evaluation, and behavioral intent, respectively. Each of these is significant as 95%;
confidence intervals did not include zero. Path estimates and standard errors for withinand between- person b paths were generated and can be seen in Table 17. Indirect effects
were then manually computed using the equation above, and confidence intervals were
generated using the RMediation package in R (Tofighi & Mackinnon, 2011). Neither
indirect effects at the within- nor the between-person level were significant for any of the
three outcomes, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5. Indirect effect estimates can be seen
in Table 17.
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Table 17. Multilevel mediation unstandardized estimates: Moral
disengagement as a mediator of the relationship between citizenship pressure
and UPB decision making elements
Outcome

Estimate

Moral disengagement (a path)

.06

SE

95% CI

.05

[-.03, .16]

Moral recognition
b path (within)
Indirect effect (within)
b path (between)
Indirect effect (between)

-.52***
-.03
-.44***
-.03

.05
.02
.06
.02

[-.61, -.43]
[-.08, .01]
[-.58, -.32]
[-.07, .01]

Moral evaluation
b path (within)
Indirect effect (within)
b path (between)
Indirect effect (between)

-.89***
-.06
-.77***
-.05

.05
.04
.06
.04

[-.98, -.82]
[-.14, .02]
[-.89, -.65]
[-.12, .02]

Behavioral intent
b path (within)
Indirect effect (within)
b path (between)
Indirect effect (between)

1.20***
.08
1.33***
.09

.05
.06
.07
.06

[1.10, 1.30]
[-.03, .19]
[1.21, 1.47]
[-.03, .21]

*** indicates p < .001

Hypothesis 6a, which proposed that moral intensity would moderate the
relationship between moral disengagement and UPB decision-making, was tested using a
1 x (1-1) multilevel moderation model for all three outcomes of interest (indicating that
the predictor, moderator, and outcome of each analysis are all measured at level 1). The
equation for this model was as follows:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
+ 𝛽2𝑗 (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)
+ 𝛽3𝑗 (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗
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𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 (𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛾02 (𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛)
+ 𝛾03 (𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛) + 𝑢0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝑢1𝑗
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30
…which includes level 1 predictors for person-centered moral disengagement, personcentered moral intensity, their interaction term, and level 2 predictors for the social
desirability control variable, and the aggregated moral disengagement and moral intensity
variables represented by person-level means. Level 2 moral disengagement and moral
intensity variables were included in the model in order to partial out any between-person
effects, which would reflect broader tendencies to morally disengage or view situations
as morally intense across contexts. This contrasts with the aim of the current analysis,
which is to determine if the moral intensity moderation occurs situation-by-situation.
Intercepts and moral disengagement slopes were allowed to vary in order to estimate the
moderating effects of moral intensity.
For the moral recognition outcome, the variance in moral disengagement slopes
was significant (τ11 = .15), as were the main effects for moral disengagement (β1j = -.31, p
< .001) and moral intensity (β2j = .40, p < .001). These were qualified by a significant
interaction (β3j = .12, p < .05), such that the negative relationship between moral
disengagement and moral recognition is weaker when moral intensity is high and stronger
when moral intensity is low (Bliese, 2002).
Similar results were found for moral evaluation, in that there was significant
variation in slopes (τ11 = .13), and main effects for both moral disengagement (β1j = -.70,
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p < .001) and moral intensity (β2j = .40, p < .001) were significant. After controlling for
the between-group effects, the within-group interaction term between moral
disengagement and moral intensity remained significant (β3j = .10, p < .05), such that the
negative relationship between moral disengagement and moral evaluation became weaker
at higher levels of moral intensity.
Finally, for behavioral intent, slopes once again varied significantly (τ11 = .16) and
significant main effects of moral disengagement (β1j = .96, p < .001), and moral intensity
(β2j = -.45, p < .001) were observed. However, the interaction term failed to reach
significance (β3j = .02, p = .75). Thus, moral intensity did not appear to influence the
slopes of moral disengagement and behavioral intent. See Figure 4 for the person-level
slopes and simple slopes of all three analyses.

Moral Intensity:
ꟷ +1 SD
ꟷ -1 SD
Figure 4.
Note: Gray regression lines indicate each participant’s line of best fit regarding moral disengagement and the
outcome. The red and blue bars represent aggregated slopes at one standard deviation above and below the
mean.
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Hypothesis 6b proposed that moral intensity would moderate the relationship
between citizenship pressure and moral disengagement. It was tested using a cross-level
(1 x (2-1)) multilevel interaction model, in which the citizenship pressure predictor and
social desirability control variable are measured at level 2 and the (person-centered)
moral intensity moderator is measured at level 1. After establishing a null model that
determines there is significant variation in moral disengagement based on person (τ11 =
.04, χ2 = 11.67, p < .01), the following model was fit:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 (𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛾02 (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)
+ 𝛾03 (𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑢0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝑢1𝑗
…which includes the level 1 person-centered moderator moral intensity, the level 2 social
desirability control variable, the level 2 citizenship pressure variable, and also, the level 2
moral intensity variable in order to partial out between-person effects and therefore
prevent them from conflating the interaction. Finally, the equation predicting B1j reflects
the cross-level interaction of citizenship pressure and moral intensity. Cross-level
interactions are most commonly employed when testing the moderating effect of the level
2 variable on the relationship between two level one variables (Woltman, Feldstain,
MacKay, & Rocchi, 2012). However, an interaction with a level 1 moderating variable
and level 2 predictor (which the current analysis suggests) is mathematically equivalent
and therefore appropriate to test the current hypothesis (Bauer & Curran, 2005).
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Prior to testing the interaction, a random intercepts model including the control
variable of social desirability, citizenship pressure, and moral intensity was first fit and
tested against a random slopes model in which slopes were allowed to vary across
persons, and this random slopes model proved to be better fitting and therefore retained.
When allowing both intercepts and slopes to vary and controlling for social desirability,
both main effects of level 1 moral intensity (β1j = -.59, p < .01) and level 2 citizenship
pressure (γ02 = .09, p < .01) on moral disengagement were significant. However, the
interaction of the two failed to reach significance (γ10 = -.02, p = .54). Hypothesis 6b was
therefore not supported.
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Table 18. Moderation of moral intensity on the relationship between citizenship
pressure and moral disengagement
Random Intercepts
Random Slopes
Slopes as outcomes
Predictor
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Intercept
Social
Desirability
Citizenship
Pressure
Moral Intensity
(L1)
Moral Intensity
person-mean (L2)
Citizenship
Pressure × Moral
Intensity
AIC

τ00
σ2
τ12

5.92***

.17

5.91***

.17

5.91***

.17

-.13***

.03

-.12***

.03

-.12***

.03

.09*

.03

.03

.09*

.03

-.58***

.02

-.59***

.03

-.59***

.03

-.84***

.05

-.84***

.05

-.84***

.05

-.02

.03

3505.53
.15
.34

.09*

3498.46
.16
.34
.04

3505.17
.16
.33
.04

Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001
Citizenship pressure was grand-mean centered while moral intensity was group-mean
centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residual
τ12 denotes the variance in moral intensity slopes

Additional Analyses
Impact of Stimulus Form
Given the unclear results of first Pilot Study 2, which suggested that presenting
vignettes as stimuli may be evoking fundamentally different responses compared to
presenting the original items written by Umphress et al. (2010). As mentioned previously,
one-third of the study sample was administered the original items instead of the vignettes,
with the goal of identifying if responses to core measures differ based on stimuli form.
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One-hundred and forty-one participants were administered the original items from
Umphress et al. (2010) as stimuli. Pseudonym text piping was also utilized to increase
external validity and maintain consistency with the vignette group. The sample was
cleansed for outliers and common method variance in an identical approach to that of the
vignette group. This cleaning was done separately form the vignette group to ensure that
the stimuli groups were not contaminating the findings of each other. To test for
differences in responses based on form, t-tests were conducted for each within-person
measure: UPB decision-making (moral recognition, moral evaluation, and behavioral
intent), moral disengagement, and moral intensity. Given the six scenarios and single
predictor (stimulus form), the following formula was applied for each within-person
measure:
(𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛1 + 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛2 + 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛3 + 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛4 + 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛5 + 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛6)/6
= 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚) + 𝑒
Results can be seen in Table 19. Regarding UPB decision-making, responses seemed to
mimic what was observed in Pilot Study 2, where significant differences were observed
for moral recognition (t = 4.34, df = 192, p < .001) in that moral recognition was higher
in the vignette group. No significant differences were observed for moral evaluation or
behavioral intent. Moral disengagement was also significantly different, such that
vignettes evoked higher levels of moral disengagement compared to the items (t = 2.80,
df = 430, p < .01). No differences were observed for moral intensity.
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Table 19. Influence of Stimulus Format
Outcome
Vignette Group
Item Group
M
SD
M
SD
t (df)
Moral Recognition
5.84
.78
5.34
1.26
4.34 (193)***
Moral Evaluation
5.40
.97
5.57
.93
-1.69 (430)
Behavioral Intent
2.98
1.23
3.01
1.38
-.25 (430)
Moral Disengagement
2.85
.68
2.65
.67
2.80 (430)**
Moral Intensity
3.07
.56
3.17
.63
-1.68 (430)
Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001

As mentioned in the discussion of Pilot Study 2, differences between the two are
not necessarily condemning of the vignette approach. The fact that moral recognition was
higher for the vignettes may simply suggest that the vignette provided enough context for
the participant to decidedly identify that an immoral behavior was being carried out,
while the original items lack such detail. It is interesting, however, that no of format
effect was seen for moral evaluation or behavioral intent; it would follow that if the
original item did not provide enough detail to be able to recognize that the behavior was
immoral, evaluations of the behavior would be lower as well.
Regarding moral disengagement, the difference in scores could potentially be due
to the specificity of the moral disengagement items. These items were written to act as
cognitive reactions to the vignettes, and while care was taken to ensure that the items
were still appropriate and sensible for the item group, the lower response patterns may be
a symptom of not having the detail necessary to accurately determine how one would
cognitively react.
While it is not completely clear what is driving these differences, we believe that
the vignettes allow us a better opportunity to align to the underlying theory of UPB
(Umphress et al., 2010; Umphress & Bingham, 2011) by controlling more of the details
of the situation rather than leaving participants to fill in idiosyncratic details. If our
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thoughts on the results of this analysis are correct, then the differences are quite possibly
being driven not by noise introduced by the vignettes, but by the ambiguity introduced by
the items.
Ethical Climate
Another additional exploratory analysis suggested by a committee member was to
examine if there was a contextual effect of ethical climate on hypotheses involving UPB
decision-making as an outcome. To examine this, several analyses were conducted. First
a moderating effect of ethical climate on the relationship between citizenship pressure
and UPB decision-making was tested. Because two subdimensions of ethical climate,
instrumental and caring, were measured, this analysis called for six multilevel moderated
regression analyses (2 ethical climate dimensions x 3 UPB decision-making outcomes).
Both citizenship pressure and ethical climate were measured between-person, and
therefore random intercepts models were adopted, as null models fit in during hypothesis
2 testing already revealed significant variation in scores attributable to persons.
Results indicated that for the moderating effect of both ethical climate
subdimensions was nonsignificant for all UPB decision-making outcomes. However, the
main effect of the instrumental subdimension of ethical climate showed to be a strong
predictor of the behavioral intent outcome (γ = .24, p < .01). In addition, when compared
to the model used to test hypothesis 3 in which ethical climate was not included, the
inclusion of the instrumental subdimension caused the main effect of citizenship pressure
on behavioral intent to drop to a nonsignificant level (γ = .09, p = .33). See Table 20 for
the results of the hierarchical random intercepts models with behavioral intent as the
outcome. Block 1 includes on the control variable of social desirability, Block 2
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introduces the citizenship pressure and ethical climate – instrumental predictors, and
Block 3 introduces the interaction term.
Table 20. Moderation of ethical climate – instrumental on the relationship between
citizenship pressure and behavioral intent
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Predictor
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
Eth. Climate – Inst.
Citizenship Pressure ×
Eth. Climate – Inst.
AIC

4.42***
-.34***

.32
.07

4.25***
-.30***
.09
.24**

.32
.07
.09
.09

4.26***
-.30***
.09
.24**
-.03

.32
.07
.09
.09
.09

6689.46
6687.36
6692.26
1.02
1.02
1.02
2.13
2.13
2.13
Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001
Social desirability, citizenship pressure, and ethical climate - instrumental were grandmean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals

τ00
σ2

To test the impact of ethical climate subdimensions on the relationship between
moral disengagement and UPB decision-making, six multilevel models were tested in
order to determine if a contextual effect of ethical climate was present on the moral
disengagement-UPB decision-making relationship. Specifically, these models aim to test
if ethical climate has a significant impact on the person-level slopes of moral
disengagement.
For each analysis, hierarchical random slopes models were fit. In each case, Block
1 containing only the control variable of social desirability, Block 2 containing the groupmean centered moral disengagement and grand-mean centered ethical climate variable,
and Block 3 introduced the interaction term. Results can be seen in Appendix L. Across
all six models, which included the three components of UPB decision-making (moral
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recognition, moral evaluation, and behavioral intent) as outcomes, and either the
instrumental or caring subdimension as the moderating variable, neither the main effects
of ethical climate nor the interaction terms were significant. However, similar to
hypothesis 6a, the main effect of moral disengagement was consistently strong, despite
controlling for ethical climate.
Relevance of the Scenario
To investigate an additional potential influence of hypotheses that include UPB
decision-making as an outcome, several analyses examining the relevance of the scenario
to one’s job (i.e., “In the job you have now, how likely is it that you might experience a
situation similar to the one described in this scenario?”) were conducted. Specifically,
relevance was examined as a moderator of the citizenship pressure-UPB decision-making
relationships as well as the moral disengagement-UPB decision-making relationships
using multilevel regression.
To test the moderating effect of relevance on the relationship between citizenship
pressure and UPB decision-making, three multilevel models were fit that included the
social desirability control, a grand mean-centered citizenship pressure variable, a group
mean-centered relevance variable, and the interaction term. When moral recognition was
the outcome, the interaction term of citizenship pressure and relevance was significant (γ
= -.07, p < .05), such that the relationship between citizenship pressure and moral
recognition became more negative at higher levels of relevance. When moral evaluation
was the outcome, the interaction approached significance, but failed to reach it (γ = -.07,
p = .08). When behavioral intent was the outcome, the interaction was significant (γ =
.14, p < .01), such that the relationship between citizenship pressure and behavioral intent
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became more positive at higher levels of relevance. Results of these analyses can be seen
in Appendix M.
Finally, regarding the moderating effects of relevance on the relationship between
moral disengagement and UPB decision-making, three random slopes models were tested
– one for each UPB decision-making stage. Each model contained the control variable of
social desirability, a group mean-centered moral disengagement variable, a group meancentered relevance variable, and an interaction term of moral disengagement and
relevance. Results indicated that the interaction term was significant for all three
components. Specifically, the relationships between moral disengagement and moral
recognition as well as moral evaluation were more negative when the situation was more
relevant. Conversely, the relationship between moral disengagement and behavioral
intent was stronger at higher levels of relevance. Results of these analyses can be seen in
Appendix N.
Discussion
The current study aimed to gain a better understanding of the decision-making
process of unethical pro-organizational behaviors when faced with feelings of obligation
regarding extra-role behaviors, or citizenship pressure. Our results support that
citizenship pressure, which may be partially brought on by feelings of identification with
the organization, could motivate the employee to engage in UPB as a way to contribute to
the employee-employer exchange relationship. Thus, our results extend those of others by
demonstrating that individuals may report willingness to engage in UPB not only because
they want to, but because they feel obligated to “go above and beyond” to contribute to
the organization. Furthermore, our results build a case that intent to perform UPB may
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result not from a failure to classify the behavior as unethical, but instead, from a
willingness to perform the behavior despite knowing it is unethical. This notion is
supported by several of our study’s findings, as described below.
Consistent with the idea that employees will feel more obligated or required to
engage in OCB as their attachment to their organization strengthens (Erhart & Naumann,
2004; Tepper et al., 2001), organizational identification was observed to be positively
associated with citizenship pressure. This supports our initial assumption that, while
organizational identification typically produces positive feelings towards the organization
(Callea et al., 2016; Dukerich et al., 2002; Tepper et al., 2001), it may also produce a felt
obligation to perform actions that benefit the organization, which Bolino and colleagues
(2010) suggest is accompanied by feelings of discomfort or anxiety. Our results suggest
that, while organizational identification does lead to helping behavior as found in past
work, it is possible that some of these behaviors intended to help may also be unethical –
i.e., UPB.
Our study was one of the first to draw direct parallels between OCB and UPB, in
that we proposed, and found, that the process of citizenship pressure evoking OCB would
also extend to evoking UPB. However, the obvious difference between OCB and UPB is
the immoral nature of UPB. A more complex process is likely occurring during UPB
elicitation compared to UPB, in that an individual must balance their desire to help the
organization with the implication of performing an immoral act. To better understand
how this mental calculation is made, the current study aimed to unpack the extent to
which each stage of Rest’s (1986) ethical decision-making process (moral recognition,
moral evaluation, and behavioral intent) was impacted by citizenship pressure.
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Citizenship pressure did have a significant effect on moral recognition and
behavioral intent, such that employees are generally less prone to recognize behaviors as
immoral and more likely to indicate intent of performing the behavior when faced with
citizenship pressure. This supports our hypothesis and suggests that perceiving
citizenship pressure may encourage employees to be more lenient regarding unethical
decisions as it would produce less dissonance should the behavior be carried out.
However, there was not a significant relationship between citizenship pressure and moral
evaluation, the decision-making element where the majority of the deliberation regarding
right and wrong takes place (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).
One potential explanation for this pattern of results may be the fact that Rest’s
four stage model is a deliberative model of decision-making, and it suggests that behavior
will only manifest if rational thought is given to the merits and demerits of a behavior.
The model excludes any influence of affect, mood, neurocognitive processes, or social
influences, which many other researchers have sought to remedy (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds,
2006; Sonenshein, 2007). Considering the moral evaluation stage is where it is thought
that the majority of the rational deliberation occurs (Rest, 1986; 1994) it is quite possible
that moral recognition, as measured by a single, somewhat non-descript item, draws upon
these additional influences not directly addressed by Rest’s model. As such, the moral
recognition item may represent more of a non-deliberative, “gut-feeling” (Klinker,
Hackmann, 2003) type of response, or potentially more subconscious, implicit attitudes
which research has shown can be influential in ethical decision-making (Marquardt &
Hoeger, 2009). Then, when asked to rationally evaluate the behavior by the moral
evaluation scale, the effect of citizenship pressure is diminished. This possibility of
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additional variables that create distortion between moral recognition and moral evaluation
is also supported by the relatively moderate correlation between moral recognition and
moral evaluation (r = .54), given their proximity to one another in Rest’s framework.
Another possible cause of the dissociation between moral recognition and moral
evaluation is desirable responding. Social desirability (Paulhus, 1991) was identified via
a common method variance analysis to be impactful on many of the morally relevant
measures, including moral evaluation. However, moral recognition did not appear to be
substantially impacted (see Table 7 for correlations). This suggests that moral recognition
is more immune to influences of social desirability, and responses to moral recognition
are “purer” in that even when responding in socially desirable ways, moral recognition
appears unaffected. Moral evaluation, on the other hand, was observed to be strongly
correlated with social desirability, indicating the respondents may be more prone to
conflate responses in such a way that would be deemed more socially acceptable. Our
findings are consistent with those of Valentine, Nam, Hollingworth, and Hall (2013), who
also examined social desirability’s relationships with Rest’s four-stage model and found a
strong relationship between social desirability and moral evaluation, while social
desirability’s impact on moral recognition was not significant. These results indicate that
there may be some underlying differences in terms of how moral recognition and moral
evaluation are conducted by participants. It should also be noted that there also remains
the possibility that desirable responding could also account for substantive variance in
moral evaluation, in that those who respond in a socially desirable way are likely more
attuned to how one “should” behave. This attunement could potentially lead to more
scrutiny regarding unethical behaviors. While the current study controlled for social
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desirability in hypothesis testing, as is commonplace in unethical behavior literature
(Chung & Monroe, 2003), it is possible that doing so removed a useful predictor that
reflects some capacity of self-regulation.
The combination of a non-significant relationship between citizenship pressure
and moral evaluation plus a positive association between citizenship pressure and UPB
behavioral intent may indicate that an employee could potentially evaluate a behavior as
unjust or unacceptable, but then decide to perform the behavior anyway in order to
alleviate their sense of obligation regarding citizenship behaviors. This is a novel finding
regarding citizenship pressure, in that this study is the first to suggest that citizenship
pressure may not actually influence how unethical one evaluates a UPB to be, but it could
nevertheless encourage individuals to overlook that evaluation and form intention to
perform the UPB in order to meet the perceived need. Similar patterns have been
observed in other research, such as Sweeney, Arnold, and Pierce (2009), who found that
organizational pressure to behave unethically was positively associated with intention to
act unethically in all four cases they studied. However, for 3 of the 4 cases they
examined, organizational pressure to behave unethically had no impact on moral
evaluations of the behavior.
The citizenship pressure-behavioral intent relationship could be influenced by
social or contextual factors as well. In the current study, an exploratory analysis
regarding ethical climate and its influence on UPB decision-making was carried out, and
results were consistent with this argument: when included in the regression equations, the
instrumental subdimension of ethical climate had a positive impact on behavioral intent,
but not on moral evaluation or moral recognition. This again supports the idea that
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behaviors may not necessarily result from the evaluation of a behavior alone, as the
influence of social, emotional, and other non-rational influences could be substantial.
Such results emphasize the importance of social context, organizational ethical culture,
and ethical leadership in employees’ ethical decision-making process.
The notion that citizenship pressure may exert influence on UPB willingness
independently of cognitive justifications is bolstered by a lack of significant association
between citizenship pressure and moral disengagement. Whereas we had expected that
individuals would respond to felt pressure by morally disengaging, we found no evidence
of such a process. Again, our results suggest that individuals may not engage in cognitive
processes to minimize the moral violation attached to UPB but may instead increase in
their willingness to perform those behaviors despite seeing them as unethical. A related
phenomenon is well-established in the cognitive dissonance literature, which suggests
that when individuals experiencing dissonance are not able to adjust their behavior (i.e.,
feel compelled to perform the act) and are not able to adjust their attitude (currently
indicated by moral disengagement remaining unaffected), they may be introducing an
additional, consonant cognition that supports the engagement of the behavior despite their
negative evaluation of it (Festinger, 1957). That is, the attitude that the employee has
regarding the behavior is unchanged by moral disengagement mechanisms, but their
willingness to perform the act still increases following the consideration of the additional
cognition, (e.g., “the behavior is critical to my career development”, “I don’t have any
other choice”). This interpretation fits with the overall pattern of findings in our study;
however, more work would need to be done to understand what these cognitions are, as
well as how and when they are being introduced into UPB elicitation process.
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Regarding moral intensity, or the extent to which a behavior is viewed as a moral
violation, it was expected that in order for moral disengagement to become activated,
contextual clues regarding the situation must first be assessed in order to gauge whether
or not disengagement is appropriate (Bandura, 1990). Our results, however, indicated no
such impact on the citizenship pressure-moral disengagement relationship. However, we
did observe a substantial negative main effect of moral intensity on moral disengagement.
This suggests that more severe ethical violations are more difficult to neutralize.
Although this relationship has been proposed by previous researchers (Detert, Treviño, &
Sweitzer, 2008), our study may be the first to our knowledge to provide empirical support
for it. The presence of a main effect that is not qualified by an interaction suggests that
the relationship between moral intensity and moral disengagement is unaffected by the
presence of citizenship pressure. In other words, people are less likely to disengage for
more severe moral violations regardless of level of felt citizenship pressure.
A fourth research question of the current study was to better understand whether
situational moral disengagement is the process by which citizenship pressure affects
UPB. We hypothesized that in order for citizenship pressure to ultimately influence UPB
decision-making, moral disengagement must first be activated in order to alleviate any
psychological discomfort that could accompany the immoral act. However, our results
did not support this proposal, as all indirect effects of citizenship pressure on UPB
outcomes were not significant. These results appear to primarily be driven by the fact that
(as previously discussed), no significant relationship was found between citizenship
pressure and moral disengagement (a path of the mediation).
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Nevertheless, the strength of the b paths should be given attention: that is, the
influence of within-person moral disengagement on the within-person outcome measures
of UPB decision-making were strongly significant, indicating that morally disengaging
from a behavior is necessary before the behavior can be carried out. The within-person
design of this study also allowed us to control for between-scenario (trait-like) moral
disengagement levels in order to help determine that the situation-specific deployment of
these moral disengagement mechanisms is a powerful predictor of UPB.
Even more interesting is the fact that the influence of moral disengagement
increases with each component of decision-making progress (B = -.59, -.89, and 1.20,
respectively). The current results could suggest that moral disengagement may actually
occur after an initial moral evaluation is made. Specifically, if moral disengagement is
less influential on moral evaluation than it is on behavioral intent, then one possible
explanation may be that, when the process of evaluation results in a judgment that
behavior is unethical, this could motivate the deployment of moral disengagement as way
to alleviate the discomfort that results from the desire to perform an unethical behavior
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003). To gather some preliminary evidence around this idea, we
estimated a multilevel model with behavioral intent as the outcome and moral evaluation,
moral disengagement, and their interaction term as the predictors, along with the social
desirability control variable. This analysis showed that while the interaction between the
two variables is not significant, the main effect of moral disengagement remains
significant despite controlling for moral evaluation. This could suggest that in some
cases, even if an individual evaluates something as immoral, the deployment of cognitive
mechanisms can still motivate the individual to establish intent to carry out the behavior.
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While there is some question in the literature regarding if moral disengagement
pre-empts the evaluation (Moore, 2008) versus occurs after it (Ashforth & Anand, 2003),
the current findings seem to complement the latter perspective. More research would
need to be done to unpack this further. For instance, a possible research question could
pertain to the influence of the individual’s propensity to morally disengage on the initial
evaluation, while a broader summation of influences, cognitive and non-cognitive, trigger
the actual activation of the disengagement mechanisms that enable to the behavior.
The three UPB outcomes also seemed to differ in terms of the role of moral
intensity. A significant interaction between moral disengagement and moral intensity was
found when moral recognition or moral evaluation was the outcome, but not when the
outcome was behavioral intent. Specifically, moral intensity lessened the effect of moral
disengagement on moral recognition and moral evaluation, presumably because the more
morally intense a behavior was, the more difficult it was for the participants to rationalize
the behavior. This contributes to the literature in that it is the first study to showcase the
interactive effect of these two constructs on UPB decision-making, particularly on a
situation-by-situation basis.
The fact that a similar pattern did not emerge for behavioral intent, however,
again suggests that there may be other contributive factors that help to determine when an
employee decides to engage in a behavior beyond just cognitive rationalizations. Intent to
actually perform the behavior may still be prone to other factors such as social influences,
concerns over job security, or other self-interests that still bar the employee from
engaging in the behavior. In support of this notion, Mencl and May (2009) found that
even in situations of low moral intensity, immoral behavior was still resisted when the
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employee feels a sense of social closeness to the affected. Additionally, in his seminal
paper introducing moral intensity, Jones (1991) acknowledges that moral intensity factors
could influence one’s sense of moral recognition and evaluation, but intention may be
more difficult to influence due to having to compete with other self-interests or selfpreservations.
Practical Implications
Our results suggest that minimization or justification of the ethical impacts of a
UPB is not necessary in order for a person to report intent to perform that UPB,
particularly in situations rated as more relevant to one’s actual job. Instead, we found that
UPB intent becomes higher as citizenship pressure increases. In applied settings, the
current findings contribute to the growing body of literature surrounding citizenship
pressure and its potential negative effects for organizations. While having employees that
highly identify with the organization is generally beneficial (Lee, Park, & Koo, 2015),
organizations should be mindful that this could also lead to feelings of obligation
regarding extra-role behaviors, which previous research has shown can lead to burnout
and intent to turnover (Bolino et al., 2010), and which the current study suggests may be
at least partially contributing to UPB. By limiting the perception of citizenship pressure,
organizations can decrease the likelihood that an employee establishes an intent to carry
out unethical behaviors. Though the literature on the predictors of citizenship pressure is
still developing, other organizations could look to literature of other similar negative
employee perceptions, such as job stress and role overload, have been shown to be a
result of perceptions such as a lack of social support, autonomy in one’s job, or
organizational support (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Conley, 1990; Van Yperen &
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Hagedoorn, 2003). What is more, organizations should do what they can to reduce
anxieties around stressful organizational practices such as layoffs (Brocker, Spreitzer, &
Mishra, 2004), in which employees may feel a heightened sense of pressure to go above
and beyond in order to secure their jobs.
We found that other variables were also significantly, directly, associated with
likelihood of UPB, and these provide other potential levers that can be used to prevent
UPBs in organizations. Considering the strong relationship between behavioral intent and
the instrumental dimension of ethical climate, which reflects the perception that selfinterest guides behaviors in the organization, despite controlling for moral
disengagement, this likely suggests that employees are more willing to perform UPBs
when they are surrounded by a culture that allows or encourages them. The fact that a
similar relationship was not also found for moral recognition and moral evaluation
suggests that employees are likely engaging in such behaviors despite morally
disapproving of them. This highlights the importance of culture in UPB decision-making,
and organizations should therefore focus efforts on reinforcing moral behavior
appropriately, both by deliberately celebrating moral behavior as well as punishing
immoral behavior, in order to develop a fairer and more ethical culture.
Given moral intensity was negatively associated with moral disengagement
despite perceptions of citizenship pressure, organizations aiming to minimize the extent
to which employees are morally disengaging from their actions may be more effective by
attempting to adjust employees’ perceptions of the severity of behaviors rather than
reducing perceptions of citizenship pressure. To do so, organizations could seek to
influence specific moral intensity components that might decrease one’s moral
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disengagement tendencies, such as attempting to personify the victims of UPBs as a way
to evoke empathy (proximity), or by clarifying the real-world impacts of unethical
behavior in order to encourage more accurate perceptions of the magnitude of
consequences. Another approach may be to reinforce the idea that part of the
organization’s identity is to be fair and ethical (social consensus). This could have two
impacts: 1.) those that strongly identify with the organization will likely align to these
values in order to maintain closeness with the organization (Liu, Zhao, Li, Zhou, & Tian,
2018), and 2.) this could also serve to more directly discourage UPBs as being viable
social exchange offerings, therefore making them less tempting.
Finally, given our results suggest that employees may engage in UPB to
reciprocate positive treatment, organizations could consider putting clear means in place
that allow employees to exhibit “above-and-beyond” behaviors, such as volunteer
activities or opportunities to join additional projects. Making such opportunities available
and publicizing them could re-direct employees’ desire to contribute to the exchange
relationship toward socially acceptable alternatives.
Potential Limitations
Several limitations deserve attention. First, while we believe that the vignettes
used in the current study provide increased context above and beyond the typically used
self-report scales, we acknowledge that vignettes still provide less context than would be
available in a real employee decision. To reduce this misalignment as much as possible,
steps were taken when constructing the vignettes to try to include as much relevant
information as possible, while also excluding overly specific information that might bias
responses. We implanted the organization pseudonym as provided by the participant into
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the vignettes, thus putting the vignette in the context of the participant’s actual job and
social situation. Any social or organizational context necessary for UPB decision-making
was therefore drawn upon by real-life factors, rather than purely hypothetical ones. The
data suggest this was particularly true for vignette scenarios that participants perceived as
more relevant to their real-life jobs, as relevance was found to be a significant moderator
variable. In addition, because our analyses indicated that moral evaluation and moral
disengagement were significantly higher among participants who read vignettes as
opposed to those who received the self-report items, we believe that the additional
context provided by the vignettes was effective in providing a fuller picture of
participants’ decision-making processes. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a) it will be
difficult to compare our results with those of past researchers using the self-report items
and b) the vignettes provide limited context relative to real-world settings.
Furthermore, we were required to develop a new method of measuring moral
disengagement that fit with our vignettes. The utilization of this measure, which focuses
on situational (within-person) deviations in moral disengagement, differentiates this study
from most moral disengagement literature to date, which examines trait moral
disengagement (for a review, see Moore, 2015). While the measure in the current study
was designed to allow for the direct measurement of each mechanism in such a way that
was specifically tailored to each scenario, doing so did introduce several challenges.
First, items were not consistent across scenarios. While this did allow us to more closely
examine disengagement regarding a particular scenario, it also means that response
distributions may partially be driven by item-specific variance in addition to variance
attributable to the construct of interest. Second, the specific mechanisms being offered as
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items may not have been the only mechanisms used to disengage from the behavior. This
allows for the possibility that respondents might have chosen to morally disengage in
ways that are going unmeasured. Third, while the items were written to reflect scenariospecific activation, there still remains the possibility that the items were not specific
enough to ensure that trait-like moral disengagement tendencies were not significantly
influencing scores. While the current within-person design does provide advantages to
ensure this is not the case (person-mean centering the moral disengagement variable and
reintroducing the person-level mean as a control variable), an ideal design would be one
in which the measurement tool can more fully isolate situation-specific moral
disengagement with minimal trait-like influence. Lastly, responses to moral
disengagement were likely partially influenced by some form of impression management
or desirable responding (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Baker, & Martin, 2013; Zuber & Kaptein,
2014) as evidenced by our common method variance analysis and the impact of
controlling for social desirability in hypothesis testing (thus, controlling for social
desirability, as we did, is likely important).
Lastly, this study was one of the first to make direct comparisons between UPB
and OCB, in that known predictors of OCB (citizenship pressure and organizational
identification) were theorized and observed to also be predictive of UPB based on similar
social exchange processes. However, there are several contrasts between UPB and OCB
that this study was not able to capture that could be theoretically significant. For instance,
there is the question of anonymity. Often times, employees are likely mindful of if their
citizenship behavior is being observed by others, particularly if they are engaging in the
OCB as a way to boost their standing with the organization. If others are witness to their
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extra-role behavior, the employee can be more confident that their behavior is being
acknowledged as a social exchange resource and will later be reciprocated (Eastman,
1994; Wayne & Green 1993). UPB is different, however, in that the majority of UPBs are
likely being carried out in private, as public knowledge of the behavior would likely be
harmful to the employee. This suggests that while OCBs may be used to alleviate
citizenship pressure in more observable ways, UPBs may be motivated more so by less
defined processes of reciprocation similar to those put forth by norm of reciprocity. That
is, UPB may be at least partially reliant on more deontic perspectives that “what goes
around, comes around”, in that by contributing to the exchange relationship, the
contribution will, in some way and capacity, be repaid (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger,
2003). There are other potential nuances that this study was also not able to capture, such
as how certain dispositional traits may differentially influence each outcome, or if there is
any relationship between the engagement of one type of behavior at the expense of the
other. That said, the fact that we were able to observe that citizenship pressure appears to
be associated with UPB in a similar way to that of OCB is a good indication that there is
at least some overlap between the two overall processes that more research could seek to
define.
Future Directions
Further comparison of the state and trait influences of moral disengagement on
unethical behaviors would be beneficial for understanding the situational levers affecting
unethical behavior. Most past studies have used global, situation-agnostic scales that
more closely reflect trait-like disengagement tendencies (Barsky, 2011; Detert, Treviño,
& Sweitzer, 2008; Valle et al., 2018). Given Bandura’s (1990) initial proposition that

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

103

moral disengagement likely exists as both a dispositional trait and an activated state,
more research is necessary to develop tools that can measure the state approach across a
wide variety of contexts. In the past, researchers have attempted to measure state-like
hypotheses by 1.) taking an approach similar to this study by using newly created items
specific to the stimuli of the study (Kish-Gephart et al., 2014), or 2.) by measuring the
influence of certain situations on responses to the trait measurement tools, with the notion
that changes to responses on a trait-like scale reflect situation-specific effects (Chen,
Chen, & Sheldon, 2016; Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Palmer, 2013;
Valle et al., 2018). Such an approach carries the underlying idea that one’s dispositional
moral disengagement propensity can be affected by a single stimulus or set of stimuli,
which Bandura argues is unlikely (1994). What is more likely is that a state-like
component of moral disengagement is being activated in direct response to the situation
to which they are exposed, and that state-like response is temporarily influencing the
respondent’s response to the dispositional moral disengagement measure. While this
study was able to adequately show that state-like activation is predictive of UPB beyond
individual tendencies (aggregated moral disengagement ratings at the person-level) using
a measure specifically designed to measure state-like activation, it does not fully capture
Bandura’s full conceptualization of moral disengagement. That is, Bandura’s theory that
moral disengagement is a product of a person’s disposition and environment requires that
both the state-like and trait-like approaches be measured and modeled simultaneously.
Researchers should seek to be more attentive of the treatment of moral disengagement,
both in terms of theory and measurement, to more closely align to Bandura’s overall
framework. For instance, researchers could examine if the trait-like tendency to morally
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disengage is better suited as a moderator of state-like moral disengagement and UPB, or
if state-like moral disengagement mediates the relationship between trait-like tendencies
and UPB.
More broadly, this study adopts Rest’s four-stage model of ethical decisionmaking when assessing the elicitation of UPB. While Rest’s model has been foundational
in the field of ethical decision-making for the past several decades (for a review, see
Craft, 2013) there have been calls regarding the necessity to critically evaluate if updates
to the model are appropriate (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). For example, the model has
received criticism for its exclusion of any emotional or non-rational components and
instead relies solely on rational deduction to determine ethical choice (Craft, 2013).
Evidence supports the notion that factors such as emotion (Connelly, Helton-Fauth, &
Mumford, 2004), mood (Curtis, 2006) and implicit attitudes (Marquardt, 2010;
Marquardt & Hoeger, 2009) are all influential in the decision-making process, so for
these and others to be excluded from Rest’s model may be cutting out meaningful pieces
of the equation. It is quite possible that UPB is partially driven by some or all of these
additional non-rational components, which could suggest that positioning Rest’s stages as
the outcome of interest in the current study does not fully capture the UPB elicitation
process. While a more comprehensive model of ethical decision-making is certainly
needed, the relationships observed in the present study could certainly benefit from the
incorporation of emotion, implicit attitudes, or other influences not captured by Rest.
Lastly, this study’s partial support for the relationship between citizenship
pressure and UPB decision-making leaves room for further investigation. Getting a better
understanding of why citizenship pressure impacts only certain parts of the decision-
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making process could be helpful in pinpointing triggers that enable or disable UPB. In
alignment with the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), it is our assumption based
on the current results that behavioral intent is motivated by citizenship pressure, while
moral evaluation is not, because there are likely other social, contextual, dispositional, or
attitudinal factors that are pushing the employee to override their evaluation of the
behavior to either engage or not engage in the behavior. For instance, employees exposed
to highly unethical leaders (Mayer et al., 2009) or those high in political skill (Bing,
Davison, Minor, Novicevic, & Frink, 2011) may be more resilient to the implications of
moral violations. Future research could aim to unpack what these factors are in order to
come to more comprehensive understanding of the relationship.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior Vignettes (adapted from Umphress
et al., 2010).
The following vignettes were presented to participants in a randomized order. Where
quotation marks (“”) are entered, participant-supplied pseudonyms were automatically
piped into the vignette. Vignettes were presented 1 per page, with moral intensity, moral
disengagement, and outcome measures immediately following each. The original UPB
items were also administered in their original format during the second study time point.
Behavior 1:
Original item: “If it would help my organization, I would misrepresent the truth to make
my organization look good.”
Vignette:
While attending a conference, you strike up a conversation with a few other
attendees that work for other organizations. You begin talking about your respective
employers, when one member of the conversation says that they recently heard on the
news that “organization” was under heavy criticism for laying off many of the workers of
a newly acquired company without offering any additional pay or benefits in the form of
severance packages. As an employee, you know the allegations against “organization,”
are true, but you also know that “organization”’s reputation is struggling because of it. To
make your organization look better, you misrepresent what you know about the
acquisition, stating that the plant was doomed to close in the coming months anyway, so
the acquisition saved many jobs. You also state that many workers chose to retire or work
elsewhere anyway, and that those few that were laid off did receive severance.
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Behavior 2:
Original item: “If it would help my organization, I would exaggerate the truth about my
company’s products or services to customers and clients.”
Vignette:
While on the phone with a potential client, you are trying to convince them to
enter into business with “organization.” After showing some resistance, the potential
client asks you to state what “organization” has to offer, and why the products or services
of “organization” is better than ABC Inc., “organization”’s biggest competitor. You know
that “organization”’s products are in no way superior to ABC Inc., but you fear that
“organization” may lose this important client if you are not convincing. To save the sale,
you respond by exaggerating the truth regarding “organization”’s products. You mislead
the client by stating that they are undoubtedly the best on the market, and describe several
features of “organization”’s products in false ways to make “organization” appear as a
much better choice compared to ABC Inc.
Behavior 3:
Original item:
“If it would benefit my organization, I would withhold negative information about my
company or its products from customers and clients.”
Vignette:
When meeting with a potential client, you are discussing what the client’s
experience would be like if they entered into business with “organization”. You feel as
though you are close to closing the deal when the client asks if “organization” has had
any recent complaints from other clients related to poor quality, craftsmanship, or
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longevity. The client emphasizes that having a trustworthy product is a high priority to
their business, and wants to ensure that what “organization” has to offer will be adequate.
You immediately think back to several recent issues that your team faced with other
clients, in which the clients cancelled their contracts with “organization” due to poor
product functionality and quality. However, you know that telling the current client about
those issues would likely discourage her from doing business with “organization.” You
therefore respond by saying that “organization” rarely gets any complaints regarding
quality, and that no such customer complaints are coming to mind.
Behavior 4:
Original item: “If my organization needed me to, I would give a good recommendation
on the behalf of an incompetent employee in the hope that the person will become
another organization’s problem instead of my own.”
Vignette:
You receive a phone call one day from another company, and they are seeking a
recommendation regarding an employee of “organization” that you’ve worked with for a
few years. This employee is consistently causing problems for “organization” due to his
incompetence, costing the company clients and resources and damaging “organization”’s
reputation. You have secretly been hoping that the employee would quit. You expect that
with this employee gone, “organization” would either be able to hire someone more
capable, or would be able to grow in other areas that advance the business. You therefore
give a very positive recommendation to the caller, exaggerating his traits and abilities and
omitting the problematic or concerning behavioral issues. Even though this is misleading,
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you hope that the new company hires the employee and he becomes their problem rather
than the problem of “organization.”
Behavior 5:
Original item: “If my organization needed me to, I would withhold issuing a refund to a
customer or client accidentally overcharged.”
Vignette:
When reviewing “organization”’s transaction history from the past few months,
you come across an invoice that includes a list of services that “organization” provided to
another company. Although handling invoices is not specifically related to your job, you
are very familiar with “organization”’s pricing, and the total amount charged to the other
company does not seem correct. Upon further inspection, you see that “organization”
seems to have mistakenly overcharged the company by a large amount. “Organization”’s
products are very complex, and considering that a few months has passed since the
transaction, it is likely that the buyer never realized the overcharge. You know that
“organization”’s financial situation has been difficult recently, and every dollar is
important in getting “organization” back on track. You therefore decide to ignore the
mistake and choose not to point out the overcharge to either the buyer or “organization”
management.
Behavior 6:
Original item: “If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could be
damaging to my organization.”
Vignette:
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You oversee the creation of a financial infographic for “organization”’s yearly
performance which will ultimately be distributed publicly and available online. The
infographic is meant to be an objective summary that serves as a quick reference for
potential investors to assess their interest in “organization.” This past year’s performance
has been weak, as “organization” had to take on large amounts of debt to cover a failed
initiative. This debt would likely be a concern for investors, which means that
“organization”’s struggle would continue if knowledge about the debt were to be made
public. The debt is clearly a substantial factor in “organization”’s financial situation, but
because this infographic is not an official report, you may choose which information to
include. You know that by omitting the debt figures, you can make “organization”’s
performance look much better, even though it does not provide all the information an
investor might need. You therefore choose to omit the debt figures from the infographic
and focus on numbers that show your organization in a positive light.
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Appendix B. Organizational Identification Scale (Mael & Ashforth, 1992)
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

When someone criticizes my
organization, it feels like a
personal insult.

1

2

3

4

5

I am very interested in what
others think about my
organization.

1

2

3

4

5

When I talk about my
organization, I usually say
‘we’ rather than ‘they’.

1

2

3

4

5

This organization’s successes
are my successes.

1

2

3

4

5

When someone praises this
organization, it feels like a
personal compliment.

1

2

3

4

5

If a story in the media criticized
my organization, I would
feel embarrassed.

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix C. Citizenship Pressure (Bolino et al., 2010)
Never
feel
pressured

Always
feel
pressured

Listen to coworkers when they have to get
something off their chest (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Take time to listen to coworkers’ problems
and worries (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Take a personal interest in coworkers (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Show concern and courtesy toward
coworkers, even under the most trying
business situations (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Make an extra effort to understand the
problems faced by coworkers (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Always go out of the way to make newer
employees feel welcome in the work
group (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Try to cheer up coworkers who are having
a bad day (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Compliment coworkers when they succeed
at work (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Take on extra responsibilities in order to
help coworkers when things get
demanding at work (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Help coworkers with difficult assignments,
even when assistance is not directly
requested (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Assist coworkers with heavy workloads
even though it is not part of the job (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Help coworkers who are running behind in
their work activities (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Help coworkers with work when they have
been absent (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Go out of the way to help coworkers with
work-related problems (H).

1

2

3

4

5

Check email or voicemail from home (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Work on days off (e.g., weekends) (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Bring things home to work on (II).

1

2

3

4

5
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Take work-related phone calls at home (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Carry a cell phone or pager for work to be
reached after normal business hours (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Stay at work after normal business hours
(II).

1

2

3

4

5

Work late into the night at home (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Attend work-related functions on personal
time (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Travel whenever the company asks you to,
even though technically you don’t have
to (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Work during vacations (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Go into the office before normal business
hours (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Volunteer for special projects in addition
to normal job duties (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Rearrange or alter personal plans because
of work (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Check back with the office even when on
vacation (II).

1

2

3

4

5

Participates in community activities for the
benefit of the company or organization
(II).

1

2

3

4

5

Defend the organization when other
employees criticize it (L).

1

2

3

4

5

Encourage friends and family to utilize
organization products (L).

1

2

3

4

5

Defend the organization when outsiders
criticize it (L).

1

2

3

4

5

Show pride when representing the
organization in public (L).

1

2

3

4

5

Actively promote the organization’s
products and services to potential users
(L).

1

2

3

4

5

Note: H = Items derived from the Helping scale by Settoon and Mossholder (2002); II = items derived from
the Individual Initiative scale by Bolino and Turnley (2005); L = items derived from the Loyal Boosterism
subscale by Moorman and Blakely (1995).
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Appendix D. Moral Intensity (May & Pauli, 2002)
Instructions: Consider the decision you made in the previous scenario and indicate your
level of agreement with each question below.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Others will be harmed by my decision
(MC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The overall harm (if any) done as a result
of my decision will be small (RC; MC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The results of my decision will be
detrimental to other people (MC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will have serious
consequences for others (MC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

There is a very small likelihood that my
decision will actually cause any harm
(RC; PE).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will definitely harm others
(PE).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will affect people in the local
community (P).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will impact my coworkers (P).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will cause harm in the
immediate future (TI).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The consequences of my decision will
occur in the near future (TI).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will harm a few people a great
deal (CE).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The consequences of my decision will
impact a small number of people in a
major way (CE).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A few individuals will bear the brunt of my
decision (CE).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Other employees in the company would
agree with my decision (SC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Others in my profession would support my
decision (SC).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Note: MC = Magnitude of consequences; PE = Probability of effect; P = Proximity; TI = Temporal
Immediacy; CE = Concentration of effect; SC = Social consensus.
RC = reverse-coded.
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Appendix E. Moral Disengagement
Moral disengagement items were created to reflect likely representations of each moral
disengagement mechanism respective of each unethical pro-organizational behavior
vignette. The response options for each scale will be as follows:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

Vignette 1 (misrepresent the truth to make my organization look good):
1. “Protecting the company’s reputation will help avoid the need for future
layoffs.” (moral justification)
2. “Sometimes little white lies are necessary” (euphemistic labeling)
3. “It’s not like I was hurting anybody” (advantageous comparison)
4. “It is what my organization would want me to do” (displacement of
responsibility)
5. Everybody lies to help their company’s image (diffusion of responsibility).
6. It probably won’t make much of a difference in the long run” (distortion
of consequences)
7. “Outsiders don’t deserve to know everything about our organization”
(dehumanization)
8. “People should be smart enough to fact check what an employee says
about their organization” (attribution of blame)
9. “As an employee, it’s my duty to stand up for my company” (appeal to
higher loyalties – neutralization)
Vignette 2 (exaggerate the truth about my company’s products or services to customers
and clients):
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1. “It’s okay to stretch the truth sometimes if your organization really needs
help” (moral justification)
2. “It’s sometimes necessary to tailor how you present information in order
to make a tough sale” (euphemistic labeling)
3. “Exaggerating about the product is not nearly as bad as outright lying”
(advantageous comparison)
4. “If I was speaking with clients, exaggerating the truth would just be part of
the job” (displacement of responsibility)
5. “Chances are, my coworkers are doing the same thing” (diffusion of
responsibility)
6. “Most clients will never be able to tell any difference” (distortion of
consequences)
7. “If customers are stupid enough to believe someone without during their
own research, it’s on them” (dehumanization)
8. “The customer should take it upon themselves to investigate further if they
really want to know” (attribution of blame)
9. “I have to do whatever I can to ensure my company profits (appeal to
higher loyalties – neutralization)
Vignette 3 (withhold negative information about my company or its products from
customers and clients):
1. “It’s okay to stretch the truth sometimes when your company really needs
help” (moral justification)
2. “I would only ever leave out a small amount of information” (euphemistic
labelling)
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3. “Leaving out information is much less harmful than making up false
information” (advantageous comparison)
4. “If I was speaking with clients, withholding negative information would just
be part of my job” (Displacement of responsibility)
5. “Any other salesperson would do the same thing” (diffusion of responsibility)
6. “Most clients go on to be satisfied with our products anyway” (distortion of
consequences)
7. “Business is dog-eat-dog; what happens to the client after the deal is done
isn’t my problem” (dehumanization)
8.

“It’s the client’s job to research a product before purchasing it” (attribution of
blame)

9. “Doing so is sometimes necessary to protect my company” (appeal to higher
loyalties – neutralization)
Vignette 4 (give a good recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent employee):
1. “It was in the organization’s best interest to get rid of the employee” (moral
justification)
2. “Doing so would be a win-win for both the employee and my company”
(euphemistic labelling)
3. “It’s not like I helped the employee lie on their resume or something”
(advantageous comparison)
4. “It is what I expect my manager would have wanted me to do” (displacement
of responsibility)
5. “Others on my team would do the same thing” (diffusion of responsibility)
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6. “The employee probably wouldn’t even end up getting the job anyway”
(distortion of consequences)
7. “If the other organization is a competitor then it’s okay to send low
performers to them” (dehumanization)
8. “If the other company can’t see that the employee would be a poor choice,
then getting stuck with them is their own fault” (attribution of blame).
9. It’s what was best for my organization” (appeal to higher loyalties –
neutralization)
Vignette 5 (withhold issuing a refund to a customer or client accidentally overcharged):
1. “Overlooking the mistake might be worth it if it helps my company survive
and we all keep our jobs” (moral justification)
2. “What the customer doesn’t know won’t hurt them” (euphemistic labelling)
3. “It’s not like anybody was in danger or anything” (advantageous comparison)
4. “It’s not my job to point out such things” (displacement of responsibility)
5. “If nobody else has mentioned it, it’s not my place to bring it up” (diffusion of
responsibility)
6. “If the customer doesn’t notice it on their own, then it probably doesn’t matter
to them all that much” (distortion of consequences)
7. “What happens to the customer after the deal is done doesn’t matter that
much” (dehumanization)
8. “If the customer really cared about the numbers being correct, they would
have reviewed their purchase more thoroughly” (attribution of blame)
9. “My company’s need for it is more important” (appeal to higher loyalties –
neutralization)
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Vignette 6 (conceal information from the public that could be damaging to my
organization):
1. “Lots of people would be hurt financially if our stock prices fell” (moral
justification)
2. “Doing this is a way I could be helping our privacy and security” (euphemistic
labelling)
3. “Leaving out details is not as bad as making things up” (advantageous
comparison)
4. “If including all information was crucial, someone would have said so”
(displacement of responsibility)
5. “Every organization chooses to conceal certain information from the public”
(diffusion of responsibility)
6. “It’s unlikely that doing so would result in much harm” (distortion of
consequences)
7. “The general public isn’t smart enough to understand this information anyway”
(dehumanization)
8. “If the public thinks organizations will air their dirty laundry, then it’s their own
fault if they are misled” (attribution of blame).
9. “Failing to conceal harmful information could cause my organization quite a bit
of unnecessary trouble” (appeal to higher loyalties – neutralization)
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Appendix F. Regulatory Focus (Neubert et al., 2008)
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I concentrate on completing my work tasks correctly
to increase my job security (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

At work I focus my attention on completing my
assigned responsibilities (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

Fulfilling my work duties is very important to me
(Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

At work, I strive to live up to the responsibilities and
duties given to me by others (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

At work, I am often focused on accomplishing tasks
that will support my need for security (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

I do everything I can to avoid loss at work (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

Job security is an important factor for me in any job
search (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

I focus my attention on avoiding failure at work (Pre)

1

2

3

4

5

I take chances at work to maximize my goals for
advancement (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

I tend to take risks at work in order to achieve success
(Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

If I had an opporutunity to participate on a high-risk,
high-reward project I would definitely take it (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

If my job did not allow for advancement, I would
likely find a new one (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

A chance to grow is an important factor for me when
looking for a job (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

I focus on accomplishing job tasks that will further my
advancement (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

I spend a great deal of time envisioning how to fulfill
my aspirations (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

My work priorities are impacted by a clear picture of
what I aspire to be (Pro)

1

2

3

4

5

At work, I am motivated by my hopes and aspirations
(Pro)

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix G. Ethical Climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988)
Instructions: We would like to ask you some questions about the general climate in
your company. Please answer the following in terms of how it really is in your
company, not how you would prefer it to be. Please be as candid as possible.
Please indicate whether you agree with each of the following statements about your
company. To what extent are the following statements true about your company?
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
What is best for everyone in the company
is the major consideration here (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

The most important concern in the good of
all the people in the company as a
whole (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

Our major concern is always what is best
for the other person (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

In this company, people look out for each
other’s good (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

In this company, it is expected that you
will always do what is right for the
customers and public (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

The most efficient way is always the right
way in this company (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

In this company, each person is expected
above all to work efficiently (Caring)

1

2

3

4

5

In this company, people protect their own
interests above all else (Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

In this company, people are mostly out for
themselves (Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

There is no room for one’s own personal
morals or ethics in this company
(Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

People are expected to do anything to
further the company’s interests,
regardless of the consequences
(Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

People here are concerned with the
company’s interests to the exclusion of
all else (Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5
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Work is considered substandard only when
it hurts the company’s interests
(Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

The major responsibility of people in this
company is to control costs
(Instrumental)

1

2

3

4

5

UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

153

Appendix H. Additional Measurement Device regarding Moral Disengagement
Per the suggestion of a committee member, the current study also included an
additional measure of a specific technique of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957).
Neutralization is a taxonomy of cognitive processes by which one can neutralize, or
diminish, the moral implications of an immoral act. These cognitive processes are meant
to serve as justifying mechanisms that allow an offender to see a deviant behavior valid
while larger society does not. While commonly adopted in research regarding juvenile
delinquency particularly involving violent or aggressive behavior, neutralization was
suggested as a potential explanatory process by Umphress and colleagues in the initial
papers on UPB.
There is substantial overlap between neutralization and moral disengagement, so
much so that some (Ribeaud and Eisner (2010)) have argued for combining the two
constructs into one overarching framework. In particular, both constructs include
techniques aimed at denying the seriousness of the consequence (distortion of
consequences vs. denial of injury), and both constructs address the act of shedding
responsibility for the action in some way or another (displacement of responsibility vs.
denial of responsibility). However, neutralization does describe a technique, appeal to
higher loyalties, that is not readily captured by moral disengagement, but that may be
relevant in the current study. Appeal to higher loyalties describes a cognitive mechanism
that may be deployed when the demands of a higher authority, such as a gang, club, or
organization, require an individual to perform an immoral act as per the norms of the
group. Thus, the offender rationalizes the behavior as being beneficial to the bigger
purpose, and the behavior is seen as a means to retaining group membership and benefits.
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Interestingly, Sykes and Matza (1957) specify that the norms of larger society do not
necessarily have to be rejected – rather, other more urgent norms attached to the higher
authority tend to take precedent.
Ribeaud and Eisner (2010) conceptualize appeal to higher loyalties as being
theoretically similar to the moral disengagement mechanism of moral justification. Moral
justification does reframe unethical acts as in service to the greater good (Moore et al.,
2012), however it does not specify that the justification is deployed as a means to benefit
a particular group or organization to which one belongs. Rather, moral justification can
be at play when a behavior is deemed as “personally or socially acceptable by portraying
it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes” (Bandura, 1999). For instance,
physically attacking someone in response to a previous action may serve to “defend one’s
honor” and restore justice to the situation, thus justifying the act. Appeal to higher
loyalties specifically refers to the norms of an authority organization that encourage an
act, independent of if the individual internally views that act as reprehensible. Thus,
appeal to higher loyalties captures a specific extension to that of moral justification: it
accounts for when the individual feels that they must engage in a behavior to meet certain
norms.
This is directly relevant to the context of the current study, in that our hypotheses
state that individuals will feel obligated to carry out behaviors that help the overall
organization and satisfy exchange norms. While moral justification accounts for instances
where the individual reframes the behavior as morally acceptable, appeal to higher
loyalties will account for instances where the individual knowingly acknowledge the
behavior’s reprehensiveness, but null the moral repercussions by deeming the violation as
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worthwhile in order to secure group resources. In order to account for appeal to higher
loyalties in the current study, a ninth item was added to each moral disengagement
measure. The mediating influence of moral disengagement was then able to be examined
both in conjunction and disjunction with appeal to higher loyalties. See the ninth item in
each moral disengagement question set. Note, these items differ to fit the specific context
of their respective vignettes.
Appendix I. Computer Self Efficacy (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; included to assess
common method variance)

Totally
Confident

Not at all
Confident

I COULD COMPLETE THE JOB
USING THE SOFTWARE
PACKAGE…

Moderately
Confident

Often in our jobs we are told about software packages that are available to make
work easier. For the following questions, imagine that you were given a new
software package for some aspect of your work. It doesn't matter specifically what
this software package does, only that it is intended to make your job easier and that
you have never used it before. The following questions ask you to indicate whether
you could use this unfamiliar software package under a variety of conditions. For
each of the conditions, please rate your confidence in your ability to complete
the job using the software package. Select a number from 1 to 10, where 1
indicates "Not at all confident," 5 indicates "Moderately confident," and 10 indicates
"Totally confident.”

…if there was no one around to
tell me what to do as I go.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had never used a package
like it before.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had only the software
manual for reference.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had seen someone else using
it before trying it myself.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I could call someone for help
if I got stuck.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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…if someone else had helped me
get started.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had a lot of time to complete
the job for which the software was
provided.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had just the built-in help
facility for assistance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if someone first showed me how
to do it first.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

…if I had used similar packages
before this one to do the same job.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Appendix J. Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding - 16 (Paulhus, 1991; short
version by Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015)
Instructions: For each statement, please indicate how much you agree with it.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I have not always been honest
with myself

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I always know why I like things

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It’s hard for me to shut off a
disturbing thought

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I never regret my decisions

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I sometimes lose out on things
because I can’t make up my
mind soon enough

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am a completely rational
person

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am very confident of my
judgments

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have sometimes doubted my
ability as a lover

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I sometimes tell lies if I have to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I never cover up my mistakes

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

There have been occasions
when I have taken advantage
of someone

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I sometimes try to get even
rather than forgive and
forget

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have said something bad about
a friend behind his or her
back

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

When I hear people talking
privately, I avoid listening

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I sometimes feel angry when I
don’t get my way

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have never borrowed anything
without asking permission
first

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix K. Example Vignette and Question Set (1 of 6)
Instructions:
Carefully read the scenario below. Then, answer the questions that follow as
truthfully as possible.
________________________________________________________________________
______
While attending a conference, you strike up a conversation with a few other
attendees that work for other organizations. You begin talking about your respective
employers, when one member of the conversation says that they recently heard on the
news that “organization” was under heavy criticism for laying off many of the workers
there with offering any severance during an acquisition of another company. As an
employee, you know the allegations against “organization,” are true, but you also know
that “organization”’s reputation is struggling because of it. To make your organization
look better, you misrepresent what you know about the acquisition, stating that the plant
was doomed to close in the coming months anyway, so the acquisition saved many jobs.
You also state that many workers chose to retire or work elsewhere anyway, and that
those few that were laid off did receive severance.

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following question regarding this
scenario:
Strongly
Disagree
The scenario presents an ethical
problem

1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate where your behavior displayed in the scenario most appropriately falls:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Just

Unjust
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Fair

Unfair

Morally right

Morally wrong

Acceptable to
my family

Not acceptable
to my family

Culturally
acceptable

Culturally
unacceptable

Traditionally
acceptable

Traditionally
unacceptable

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following question regarding the
behavior in this scenario:
Strongly
Disagree
If I were in this situation, I would
have made the same decision.

1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7
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Imagine yourself carrying out the behavior that the scenario describes. For the following
statements, please indicate the extent to which you believe you would factor in each
statement to justify your action.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Protecting the company’s reputation at
the conference will help avoid the
need for future layoffs.

1

2

3

4

5

All I told were some little white lies

1

2

3

4

5

It’s not like I was hurting anybody

1

2

3

4

5

I think this is what my organization
would have wanted me to do

1

2

3

4

5

Everybody lies to protect their
company’s wrongdoings

1

2

3

4

5

They’ll probably forget the whole thing
soon anyway

1

2

3

4

5

Those people don’t need to know the
truth anyway

1

2

3

4

5

It was rude of them to ask about such a
sensitive topic in the first place

1

2

3

4

5

Imagine that you had done the behavior presented in the scenario. What other thoughts
might you have regarding why you decided to carry out this behavior?
___________________________
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Consider the decision you made in this scenario and indicate your level of agreement with
each question below.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Others will be harmed by my decision

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The overall harm (if any) done as a
result of my decision will be small

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The results of my decision will be
detrimental to other people

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will have serious
consequences for others

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

There is a very small likelihood that
my decision will actually cause any
harm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will definitely harm others

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will affect people in the
local community

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will impact my
coworkers.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will cause harm in the
immediate future

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The consequences of my decision will
occur in the near future

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My decision will harm a few people a
great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The consequences of my decision will
impact a small number of people in
a major way

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A few individuals will bear the brunt of
my decision

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Other employees in the company
would agree with my decision

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Others in my profession would support
my decision

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix L. Moderation of ethical climate (caring and instrumental subdimensions) on
the relationship between moral disengagement and UPB decision-making
Moral Recognition
Moral Evaluation
Behavioral Intent
Predictor
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Caring subdimension
Intercept
5.62***
.21
4.44***
.22
4.27***
.30
Social Desirability
.05
.05
.22***
.05
-.30***
.07
1.21***
.05
Moral Diseng.
-.53***
.05
-.90***
.04
Ethical Climate
-.07
.07
-.04
.08
.01
.10
Moral Diseng. ×
.07
.07
-.06
.06
-.07
.07
Ethical Climate
AIC
5304.40
4908.79
6043.15
1.20
.45
.81
τ00
1.33
.90
.66
σ2
Instrumental
subdimension
Intercept
Social Desirability
Moral Diseng.
Ethical Climate
Moral Diseng. ×
Ethical Climate
AIC

5.72***
.03
-.52***
-.05

.02
.05
.05
.05

4.47***
.22***
-.90***
-.08

.21
.05
.04
.07

-.10

.05

-.01

.04

4.13***
-.27***
1.21***
.28***
.11

.28
.06
.05
.08
.05

5302.45
4909.06
6033.49
1.15
.45
-.80
τ00
1.33
.89
.66
σ2
Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001.
Final block (block 3) of each hierarchical model shown. Social desirability and ethical
climate (both subdimensions) were grand-mean centered; moral disengagement was
group-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals
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Appendix M. Moderation of relevance on the relationship between citizenship
pressure and UPB decision-making
Moral Recognition Moral Evaluation
Behavioral Intent
Predictor
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Intercept
Social Desirability
Citizenship Pressure
Relevance
Citizenship Pressure ×
Relevance
AIC

5.73***
.03
-.13*
-.06

.21
.05
.05
.03

4.56***
.20***
-.09
-.21***

.25
.06
.07
.03

4.31***
-.31***
.19*
.29***

.32
.07
.08
.04

-.07*

.04

-.07

.04

.14**

.05

5477.61
5554.72
6588.59
1.10
.42
.75
τ00
1.82
1.02
.97
σ2
Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001.
Final block (block 3) of each hierarchical model shown. Social desirability and
citizenship pressure were grand-mean centered; relevance was group-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals
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Appendix N. Moderation of relevance on the relationship between moral
disengagement and UPB decision-making
Moral Recognition Moral Evaluation
Behavioral Intent
Predictor
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Est.
SE
Intercept
Social Desirability
Moral Disengagement
Relevance
Moral Disengagement
× Relevance
AIC

5.69***
.04
-.52***
-.02

.20
.05
.05
.02

4.45***
.23***
-.88***
-.09***

.21
.05
.04
.02

4.20***
-.29***
1.17***
.14***

.28
.06
.05
.03

-.10**

.04

-.10**

.03

.11*

.04

5302.83
4886.72
6021.12
1.19
.45
.80
τ00
1.31
.89
.65
σ2
Note: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, *** indicates p < .001.
Final block (block 3) of each hierarchical model shown. Social desirability was grandmean centered; moral disengagement and relevance were group-mean centered.
τ00 denotes variance in intercepts
σ2 denotes the within-person residuals

